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NOTES

Clinging to Democracy: Assessing the
Russian Legislative-Executive
Relationship Under Boris Yeltsin's
Constitution
ABSTRACT

The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation has
received harsh criticism as a document that confers strong
powers upon the executive at the expense of a much weaker
legislature. Such a disparity is understandable, as the
Constitution was conceived out of the violent confrontation
between President Boris Yeltsin and the rebellious
communist-nationalistDuma in October 1993. Following the
adoption of the Constitution in December 1993, many
observerspredicted a return to dictatorshipin Russia.
Yet in practice, despite much heavy-handedness on the
part of the president during the Yeltsin administration, the
1993 Constitution and the institutions it created have
survived remarkably intact. The various governmental actors
largely have followed the procedures of the Constitution, and
perhaps most importantly, Yeltsin never employed the most
striking provision at his disposal-dissolution of the
legislature.
Nevertheless, critics and supporters alike have reason to
be concerned with the current Russian Constitution. While
under a generally pro-democratic and pro-Western Yeltsin,
constitutional abuses were few, a different result could easily
have resulted under a more vigorous executive.
This Note assesses the state of the Russian Constitution,
as the country's leadership is handed over from the erratic
yet familiar Boris Yeltsin to the firm yet enigmatic ex-KGB
colonel Vladimir Putin. Beginning with a brief description of
historicalfactors that affect the current Russian Constitution
and Russian attitudes to the concept of the rule of law, this
Note then examines the principal constitutionalprovisions at
issue here, namely those concerningthe relationshipbetween
the executive and the legislature. The Note then analyzes
this relationshipas it has developed in practice,particularly
645
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highlighting the two major confrontations of 1998. Lastly,
this Note suggests avenues for constitutional amendment, in
orderto protect against executive excesses that may be more
likely under a leader such as Putin, whose commitment to
democracy and the rule of law remains questionable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the adoption of the Russian Constitution' in December
1993, many observers have noted its flawed attempt at separation

1.

KONSTITUTSWYA ROSSISKOl FEDERATSII (1993) [hereinafter KONST. RF].
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2
of powers between the legislative and executive branches.
Although Russia's new leaders purport _Jo be creating a
democratic system, the vastly stronger powers delegated to the
president at the expense of the legislature belie the principles
behind such claims. Indeed, some have predicted that in such a
system the president would abuse those powers, returning the
3
country to a dictatorship.
Yet despite this decided imbalance of powers among the three
branches, Russia's government and Constitution have survived
relatively intact during its first six years as a constitutional
republic, even through economic collapse in 1998.
Former
President Boris Yeltsin, despite periodic economic and political
crises, neither employed his power to dissolve the Duma nor
declared a state of emergency. 4 Meanwhile, the legislature has
survived three national elections, and despite its anti-reformist
rhetoric, has passed much civil and commercial legislation.5 In
short, the executive and legislative branches have coexisted in
relative peace 6 and have even shown brief signs of compromise
and conciliation.
This Note will explain the legislative-executive relationship in
the context of Russia's turbulent history of authoritarianism,

2.
See, e.g., Michelle Lynn McClure, An Analysis of the New Russian
Constitution, 4 J. Intl L. & Prac. 601 (1995); Lee Kendall Metcalf, Presidential
Power in the Russian Constitution, 6 J. TRANSNATL L. & POLY 125 (1996); Amy J.
Weisman, Separation of Powers in Post-Communist Government: A Constitutional
Case Study of the RussianFederation,10 AM. U.J. INT't L. & POL' 1365 (1995).
3.
See Weisman, supra note 2, at 1397 (stating that "[e]ndowing a single
person with such a disproportionate amount of control over the Federation not
only diverges from the Constitution's stated dedication to the separation of
powers, it may well lead to a retreat into autocratic rule in Russia").
4.
See infra Part IV.
5.
See, e.g., Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF (Civil Code), Sobr. Zakonod. RF,
1994, No. 32, Item 3301; Federal'nyi Zakon o Aktsionernykh Kompaniyakh
[Federal Law on Joint Stock Companies], Ross. Gazeta Dec. 26, 1995; Federal'nyi
Zakon o Torgovlye Tsennykh Bumagax [Federal Law on the Securities Market],
Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 17, Item 1918. See generally WILLIAM G. FRENKEL,
COMMERCIAL LAW OF RUSSIA: A LEGAL TREATISE (1997) (analyzing developments in
commercial legislation in Russia).
Robert Sharlet notes in particular the
successes of the first Duma of 1994-1996, which passed 328 bills, of which 236
were signed into law by the president.
See Robert Sharlet, Transitional
Constitutionalisn:Politics and Law in the Second Russian Republic, 14 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 495, 509 (1996). Moreover, most of the legislative output "was de novo for
Russia or replacements for rejected or superseded laws," as opposed to being
generated (as most legislation is) from within laws already enacted. Id. at 510.
Nevertheless, much work remains to be done, particularly in significant areas
such as property law, contract law, and reform of the tax code.
6.
Certainly, there has been no repetition of the 1993 shelling of the
parliament building. Yeltsin ended a violent showdown with the Soviet-era
legislature by ordering tanks to shell the parliament building in which nationalist
and communist legislators who refused to obey the president's decree dissolving
the parliament were holding out. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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offering both seeds of hope for the future of the new Constitution
and suggestions for reform. While on paper the Constitution
appears to allow the president much room for abuse, in practice
he has been relatively restrained in his actions, and ultimately,
the legislature has briefly even managed to wrest significant
concessions from the president without resorting to force. 7
Nevertheless, there is reason to be cautious in measuring the
success of the Constitution-with a more vigorous executive, a
contrary result could easily have obtained. The accession of
former Committee for State Security (KGB) colonel Vladimir Putin
to the presidency raises serious questions about the future of
Russia's fledgling constitutional institutions.8
Part II will examine the roots of the Russian Constitution,
from both a long-term historical perspective, as well as in light of
Russia's transition from communism, appreciating the progress
the country has made given its essentially embryonic legal and
constitutional consciousness.
Part III will describe the
distribution of powers at issue, focusing on the president's ability
to dissolve the Duma and to declare a state of emergency and the
Duma's inability to impeach the president. Part IV will analyze
how the different branches have employed those powers in their
dealings with one another, particularly in the context of their two
showdowns in April and September of 1998. Part V will offer
some thoughts on the future of the Constitution, suggesting that
although the branches may be able to coexist in their current
form, the potential for abuse and the need for amendments
remain.

II. FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO DEMOCRACY

An examination of Russia's prospects as a constitutional
republic with an effective legislative-executive relationship must
first consider Russia's long history of authoritarianism.
This
history has shaped Russians' perspectives toward law and the

7.
See infraPart IV.C.
8.
See David Hoffman, Putin Steps Out of the Shadows, WASH. POST, Jan.
30, 2000, at Al.
Putin's KGB career consisted of spying on foreigners in
Leningrad in the 1970s and in working to steal Western technology while in East
Germany in the 1980s. See id. Although he has voiced support for free market
economics and democratic institutions, he has been slow to condemn some of the
violent excesses of the state and the security service for which he worked. See id.
Meanwhile his execution of the 1999-2000 Chechen War raises questions about
his commitment to democracy, human rights, a free press, and close ties with the
West. See id.; Putin the Great Unknown, ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2000, at 19; Vladimir
Putinr, Russia'sPost Cold-Warrior,ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2000, at 51.
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rule of law. 9 For much of the country's existence, the absence of
the rule of law and legitimate legal institutions have been the
norm, thereby making the current transition to a governmental
system based on law and the separation of powers all the more
difficult.1 0
A. Foundationsof the Russian State
Russia owes much of its stunted legal growth to centuries of
occupation by the Mongols and general geographic isolation from
the ideas of the West. The Mongols, who ruled Russia from the
thirteenth to the fifteenth century, laid the foundations of the
Russian autocratic state." The influence of Byzantium' 2-with
its concept of the unity of church and state-also created fertile
ground for tsarist autocracy, from Ivan the Terrible through
Nicholas II.13 The Russian Orthodox religion, which emphasizes
conformity and unity, has similarly affected Russian legal
institutions. 14 As a result of these influences, by the seventeenth

9.
See John P. Willerton & Aleksei A. Shulus, Constructing a New Political
Process; The Hegemonic Presidency and the Legislature, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv.
787, 790-91 (1995) ("A strong executive with power concentrated in a small
governing elite, characterizes all former Russians political systems... [Ministries
and representative bodies] never constrained the chief executive. The executive
ignored and even dissolved such representative bodies when necessary.").
10.
See Molly Warner Lien, Red Star Trek.- Seeking a Role for Constitutional
Law in Soviet Disunion,30 STAN. J. INTL L. 41, 48 (1994) ("This Russian 'tradition'
of unrestricted government power contributes to the present difficulties in
establishing a law-based state.").
11.
See GORDON B. SMITH, REFORMING THE RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 4 (1996);
Lein, supra note 10, at 49-51 (describing the influence of autocratic Mongol rule
on the creation of the Russian state).
12.
Prince Vladimir of Kievan Russia brought Christianity to Russia from
Byzantium in 988. See NICHOLAS V. RIAsANovsKY, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA 33-36 (4th
ed. 1984). Moreover, as Riasanovsky notes,
Russian allegiance to Byzantium determined or helped to determine much
of the subsequent history of the country. It meant that Russia remained
outside the Roman Catholic Church, and this in turn not only deprived
Russia of what the church itself had to offer, but also contributed in a
major way to the relative isolation of Russia from the rest of Europe and its
Latin civilization. It helped notably to inspire Russian suspicions of the
West ....
Id. at 36.
13.
See SMITH, supra note 11, at 5.
14.
See ROBERT AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, 1985-1996, 115-16 (1997).
Commenting on the influence of religion on Russian deliberative bodies, Ahdieh
writes that
[o]rthodoxy has traditionally viewed compromise through a moral and
religious construct antithetical to modem political dialogue. In the opinion
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century, Russia possessed
a complex and cumbersome array of customs, legal traditions,
tsarist decrees, clerical rulings, and administrative decisions. The
judicial system was rudimentary, the legal profession non-existent,
and the powers of the tsar and state unconstrained by law, the
15
church, or the landed nobility, not to mention the masses.

Although in the eighteenth century Peter the Great attempted
sweeping reforms to bring Russia to the advanced level of the
West, most of the legal reforms he realized were "largely
concerned with strengthening the power of the state, and thereby
enhancing his own power over the regional nobility."' 6 Moreover,
the law became an instrument of the autocracy, rather than a
check on the tsar's power. 17 The autocratic power of the tsar was
"absolute and unrestrained."' 8 In such a system, in which the
tsar was resolved to retain all legislative, executive, and judicial
powers, Western legal values had little chance of flourishing.
Essentially, the Enlightenment had little effect on Russian legal
development. 19
Russia has thus shown a "fundamental ambivalence" toward
the law throughout its history. 20 On the one hand, there is a
desire to protect justice and order in the state; on the other, there
is fierce resistance to any reforms that would lessen the power of
the monarch. 2 1 This tension pervades the Russian legal culture
as much today as it did in centuries past.

of the church, to compromise was to "sell out the truth," to concede to
falsehood and thus to evil-a deed no faithful believer could accept ....
In
the realm of politics, this conception helps explain the absence of any
sense of a loyal opposition in Russian or Soviet mentality. Such a notion,
in the Russian view, is an oxymoron.
Id. at 116.
15.
SMITH, supra note 11, at 5.
16.
Id. at 7; see also Lien, supra note 10, at 52-54 (describing Peter the
Great's legal reforms). As Lien explains, "Peter needed absolute power to achieve
his goal of making the Russian Empire a dominant world force. To accept a
system of enforceable legal rights would have been anathema." Lien, supra note
10, at 52-53.
17.
SMITH, supranote 11, at 7.
18.
Id. at 9. This power was even codified into Russian law. According to
Article 1 of the Svod Zakonov (Digest of Laws) of 1832, "[t]he All-Russian Emperor
is an autocratic and unlimited monarch. Obedience to his supreme power not
only from fear but also from conscience is ordained by God Himself." Id. at 8.
19.
See Louise I. Shelley, Legal Consciousness and the Pravovoe
Gosurdarstvo, in TOWARD THE "RULE OF LAW' IN RUSSIA? 63, 65 (Donald D. Barry

ed., 1992) ("[T]he legal values of the enlightenment were not institutionalized in a
society where the monarch still sought to keep an absolute grip on power."); see
also SMITH, supra note 11, at 9-10.
20.
SMITH, supra note 11, at 11.
21.
Seeid. at11-12.
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B. Toward a More Enlightened System
With the accession of Alexander II to the throne in 1856, and
his subsequent freeing of the serfs in 1861, Russia appeared to be
moving toward a more liberalized society. 2 2 The legal reforms of
1864 symbolized this "Golden Age of Russian Law."2 3 Two major
influences lay behind these reforms, both of which underlie
similar legal reforms in the 1980s and 1990s.2 4 First, new laws
were necessary to facilitate expanding contracts with other
European empires.2 5
Second, a rising, Western-educated
intelligentsia, an intellectual and commercial elite, viewed
adherence to the rule of law as an essential characteristic of
civilized European states. 2 6 As a result, the 1864 reforms created
a modern judicial system, including competent judges and a
2 7
professional Russian bar with high standards.
The reforms, however, generated backlash from two major
elements of society. One was the Slavophiles, who rejected the
Western ideals that the reforms represented and chose instead "to
preserve the uniqueness of Russian society."2 8 The other was the
revolutionaries, largely students, for whom the reforms did not go
far enough.2 9
Their increasingly strident demands created an
atmosphere of violence,
as the autocracy countered with

reactionary crackdowns, which provoked acts of terrorism against
the government.3 0 This downward spiral of terrorist activities,
answered by repression from the regime, eroded what little
3
support existed for a modern, functionary system of rule of law. '
Consequently, Russians lived under a system of virtual martial

22.
See RICHARD S. WORTMAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RusSIAN LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS 244-67 (1976) (describing the process and effects of legal reform
under Alexander II).
23.
See SMITH, supra note 11, at 14.
24.
See infra Parts II.D-E.
25.
See SMITH, supranote 11, at 14.
26.
See id.
27.
See id. at 17.
28.
Id. at 14. The ideological struggle between the Westernizers, who
favored industrialization, secularization, the rule of law, and the rise of a middle
class, and the Slavophiles, who supported traditional, idealistic virtues of the
Russian peasant commune Orthodoxy, and the autocratic rule of the tsar are
echoed loudly in today's debate between free-market economists and communistnationalists in the State Duma.
29.
See id. at 18.
30.
Indeed, Alexander II himself was killed by a terrorist's bomb in St.
Petersburg in 1881. See RIASANOVSKY, supra note 12, at 384. His son and
successor, Alexander III, was greatly influenced by his father's assassination and
subsequently undid most of Alexander II's reforms. See Lien, supra note 10, at
60-61.
31.
See SMITH, supranote 11, at 18.
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law for the last thirty-six years of the Romanov dynasty, from
Alexander II's death in 1881 to Nicholas II's abdication in 1917.32
Thus, despite the nineteenth century efforts of legal experts to
raise
fundamental issues of citizens' rights and the appropriate role of the
state in the enforcement of law. . . . [Russia] never succeeded in
transforming an authoritarian society to one based on the rule of law.
Consequently, a legal consciousness was never institutionalized among
33
state officials or among the citizenry before the [1917] revolution.

It was in this turbulent, polarized atmosphere that Russia
began to experiment with an elected representative governmental
body, the State Duma, which Nicholas II created in his "October
Manifesto" of 1905, a pseudo-constitution. 3 4
According to the
Manifesto, "no law shall acquire force without the approval of the
State Duma and . . . the people's representatives shall have an
effective opportunity to participate in supervising the legality of
the actions of the authorities whom We have appointed."3 5 The
Duma, despite its appearance as a striking concession to the
people, was in reality a powerless institution-Nicholas dissolved
it twice within the first two years of its existence, 3 6 finally

32.
See id. at 21.
33.
Shelley, supranote 19, at 65.
34.
See RICHARD PIPES, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 42-44, 153-54 (1990). The
Manifesto was further articulated and codified in May 1906 with the government's
promulgation of the Fundamental Laws. See RIASANOVSKY, supra note 12, at 408.
Under the Fundamental Laws, the tsar retained huge executive powers, could
disband the Duma and call for new elections, veto legislation, and issue decrees in
the Duma's absence. See id. Meanwhile, the Duma's legislative powers were
restricted to certain areas, and it had no input on ministerial appointments save
for a questioning period. Id. at 409; cf. infra Part III (explaining similar powers
granted to each branch under the 1993 Russian Constitution).
-35.
PIPES, supra note 34, at 43.
One of Nicholas II's predecessors,
Alexander I, had actually considered a similar proposal for a constitutional
monarchy a century before. See ALEXANDER M. YAKOVLEV, STRIVING FOR LAW IN A
LAWLESS LAND: MEMOIRS OF A RUSSIAN REFORMER 27 (1996). Alexander's plan would
have created an Imperial State Duma-whose members would be elected indirectly
through local dumas-and an Imperial State Council, whose members would be
appointed by the Tsar. See id. The State Council in fact was created in 1810, but
the Napoleonic Wars, followed by a reactionary revolt in 1825, quashed any
further plans for implementing a representative system. See id. at 27-29.
36.
See PIPES, supra note 34, at 164, 181. The first Duma immediately
emerged as a vociferous opponent of the regime, demanding abolition of the upper
chamber of the legislature, the power to appoint and dismiss ministers, and
amnesty for political prisoners. See id. at 163. After the Tsar refused to grant an
audience with representatives of the Duma, the Duma passed a no-confidence
resolution against the cabinet, as well as a demand that it be allowed to choose a
ministry itself. See id. at 164. Fearing a peasant uprising, and concerned with
the prestige of the government, the Tsar dissolved the Duma just weeks after it
first convened. See id.
The second Duma, which opened in February 1907, "was even more radical
than the first," dominated as it was by socialists and other revolutionaries. Id. at
179. Eventually, the prime minister sought to lift the deputies' immunity, so that
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reinstating it with a stacked deck of conservatives that supported
3 7
the monarchy.
The Duma arguably was doomed from the start for two
reasons.3 8 First, the October Manifesto was extracted from the
tsar under duress; therefore, he never felt obligated to respect
it. 3 9
Second, the Manifesto never mentioned the word
"constitution," as Nicholas intentionally avoided the use of the
term in order to preserve the illusion that he remained an
autocrat. 40
As a result, the Duma suffered from lack of
legitimacy as its very existence depended, like so much else in
Russia, on the whims of the tsar.
Ultimately, the Duma was a victim of Russia's autocratic and
Orthodox heritage, which viewed compromise and conciliation as
weaknesses, and dissent as anathema. 4 1 "The government and
the opposition alike viewed the Duma not as a vehicle for
reaching compromises, but as an arena of combat, and sensible
42
voices, pleading for cooperation, were vilified by both sides."
C. The Soviet Experience
Perhaps more disastrous for Russian legal consciousness
than the long history of autocracy were the nearly seventy-five
years of communist rule from 1917 to 1991.4
The 1917
Revolution and the three years of civil war that followed
"obliterated respect for legal norms," not only by law enforcers,
but by those subject to their authority as well. 44 The Bolsheviks
believed the commitment to the rule of law to be a bourgeois
concept and that legal institutions should wither away along with
the state. 45
Meanwhile, Lenin demonstrated the Bolshevik

several of them could be charged with mutiny. See id. at 181. The Duma agreed,
but only if the government could produce concrete evidence of sedition. See id.
The Tsar subsequently dissolved the second Duma in June 1907. See id.
37.
See id. at 182.
38.
See id. at 44.
39.
See id.
40.
See id. The tactic would prove problematic. As Pipes indicates, the
"absurd concept of a constitutional autocrat.., would cause no end of trouble in
relations between the Crown and the Duma in the years to come." Id.
41.
See AHDIEH, supra note 14, at 115-16.
42.
PIPES, supra note 34, at 51. Louise Shelley's epitaph for the failed
Duma is worth remembering when considering the current Russian legislature:
'IThe pre-Revolutionary Duma] lacked the power, the experience, and the
representativeness to make it a force able to enact law successfully in an
increasingly unstable society." Shelley, supra note 19, at 65.
43.
The Stalinist period in particular (1927-1953) was the "antithesis of the
rule of law and a period that established a strong and unfortunate legacy for the
contemporary period." Shelley, supra note 19, at 66.
44.
Id. at 65.
45.
See id.
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disregard for democratically elected institutions with his forcible
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in February 1918.46
Until the time of Gorbachev, the Soviet government denounced
the very concept of a law-based state: in theory, because it
conflicted with Marxist-Leninist doctrine; in practice, because it
conflicted with Communist Party authority over the state itself.4 7
This is not to say that law was absent from Soviet society; the
vast collection of statutes and codes attest to its importance in
the Soviet era.48 Nevertheless, law in the Soviet Union was not,
as in the West, a means for society to exercise control over the
leadership; rather, it was a means by which the leadership
49
controlled society.
The Communists did adopt a series of constitutions during
the Soviet Union's existence.5 0 The Soviet concept of a
constitution, however, stressed flexibility; it was not a document
to which "legislators and administrators would be bound rigidly in
building a new socialist Russia."5 l Its permanence was doubtful,
as it was subject to changing political views within the
leadership.5 2
The 1977 Constitution, which required nearly

46.
The Constituent Assembly had been elected, as originally scheduled by
the Provisional Government, in November 1917, after the Bolsheviks had seized
power. See PIPES, supra note 34, at 539-40. When the Assembly proved hostile to
the Bolsheviks, Lenin forced its dispersal through intimidation tactics. See id. at
537-40, 552-55 for a detailed history of the elections and short life of the
Constituent Assembly.
47.
See Harold J. Berman, The Rule of Law and the Law-Based State
(Rechtsstaat),in TOWARD THE "RULE OF LAW" INRUSSIA?, supranote 19, at 43.
48.
See Lien, supra note 10, at 69-71. Although the Bolsheviks originally
opposed the need for laws, they were soon "forced to rely on law themselves as a
means of imposing the concept of a worker's state." Id. at 69. Within half a
decade after the Revolution, the Soviet government adopted a Civil Code, a Code of
Civil Procedure, a Criminal Code, a Code of Criminal Procedure, and a Labor
Code. See id. at 71.
49.
See Harold J. Berman, Comparisonof Soviet and American Law, 34 IND.
L.J. 559, 561-63 (1959).
50.
Four separate constitutions were adopted, in 1918, 1924, 1936, and
1977. See ARYEH L. UNGER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTHE USSR: A GUIDE TO
THE SOVIET CONSTITUTIONS 1 (1982).

51.

John N. Hazard, The Evolution of the Soviet Constitution, in TOWARD THE

"RULE OF LAW" INRUSSIA?, supranote 19, at 93. As Soviet legal reformer Alexander

YAKOVLEv explains,
From the Marxist, materialistic point of view, everything is subjective.
Ideas are nothing but the expression of the social and economic conditions
of a particular subject (a person or a class). Ideas exist specifically to serve
one's aims, regardless of any other interests. From this standpoint, a
constitution is, first and foremost, nothing but a political tool; therefore, it
must serve particular political interests.
YAKOVLEV, supra note 35, at 38-39.

52.

See id.
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twenty years of drafting, reflected the ideological ferment released
after Stalin's death in 1953.53
The Soviet-era constitutions created, on paper, "a network of
broadly representative, independent assemblies with supreme
legislative, administrative, and supervisory authority at their
respective levels." 5 4 In practice, however, these legislative bodies
were little more than ornamental institutions "convened each year
to rubber-stamp laws prepared in advance by [Communist Party]
authorities."5 5 More importantly, it was through the passivity of
these "democratic" institutions that Stalin was able to implement
his campaign of terror in the 1930s. 5 6 Thus, until the rise of
General Secretary (and later Soviet President) Mikhail Gorbachev
in the 1980s, Russians had virtually no exposure either to
democratically elected legislative institutions or to the concept of
a separation of powers.
D. Gorbachev's Reforms
In the late 1980s, the Communist Party began speaking of
the concept of the law-based state as a fundamental dimension of
the "new thinking" called for by Gorbachev and the Soviet
leadership.5 7 Such discourse was not wholly genuine, however,
as Gorbachev had initiated legal reform less out of concern for
building a "legal consciousness" than to further his economic
reforms. 5 8

53.

See Hazard, supra note 51, at 102-03. The 1977 Constitution was a

product of the changes in Soviet society since Stalin, distancing the government
from the terror of the Stalinist era. See ROBERT SHARLET, SOVIET CONSTITUTIONAL
CRISIS: FROM DE-STALINIZATION TO DISINTEGRATION 16-21 (1992) (describing the
1977 Constitution as "codifying de-Stalinization"); see also UNGER, supra note 50,
at 173-79 (1982) (providing a history of the drafting process of the 1977
Constitution).
Frances Foster-Simons, The Soviet Legislature: Gorbachev's 'School of
54.
Democracy", in TOWARD THE "RULE OF LAW" IN RUSSIA?, supranote 19, at 115, 116.
Id.
55.
See AHDIEH, supra note 14, at 30. As one Russian legal scholar
56.
explained, "Stalin became a dictator through constitutional bodies-through the
Congress and through the government." Id. (interview with Boris Topornin).
Indeed, Stalin used legal institutions in general as a means of extending his
power. "Stalin discovered that his dictatorial powers could be maintained more
effectively with a system of law than without it." Berman, supranote 49, at 566.
57.
Berman, supra note 47, at 43. In essence, Gorbachev sought to end
the legal nihilism of the Soviet system. "The ideas of judicial independence, the
primacy of constitutional norms, and the concept of the separation of the justice
system from the party, once espoused only by human rights activists, became part
of the Communist Party program .... " Shelley, supranote 19, at 67.
See AHDIEH, supranote 14, at 98-99.
58.
Reform, however, focused on the separation of powers and other structural
principles of the legal state, not on its cultural underpinnings. Both
Gorbachev and Yeltsin after him seemed to hope that constitutionalism
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In 1989, Gorbachev revived the Congress of People's
Deputies, an elected body that had existed under the 1918 and
1924 Constitutions, but which Stalin had abolished in the 1936
Constitution.5 9 The Congress was not truly democratic, as
electoral safeguards permitted the Communist Party to retain
Nevertheless, the new
control of the legislative process. 6 0
that quickly proved its
institution
Congress was a representative
formed political
deputies
the
as
the
regime,
from
independence
Yeltsin's New
as
Boris
such
design,
groupings of their own
6 1 and passed significant legislation on human
Moscow Deputies,
rights and freedoms. 62 Despite its significance as a separate
deliberative body, the Congress was hampered by structural flaws
and that ultimately contributed to its lack
that made it unwieldy
63
effectiveness.
of
Gorbachev, wary of the deputies' independence, subsequently
created the post of President of the Soviet Union-to which he

could be built at the institutional rather than the individual level. They
expected newly created institutions to become the focus of people's "faith,"
until then directed largely at Communist ideology and the state that stood
on its shaky foundations. These institutions would serve as a lodestone
for new political forces and lay the groundwork for further change. A
strengthened legal consciousness might be a collateral effect of these
reforms, but it was not their primary focus.
Indeed, Gorbachev's reforms generally consisted of attempts to
Id. at 99.
transplant evolved Western democratic institutions and practices into the
primitive economic, political, and legal soil of the Soviet Union.
Hoary concepts such as democracy and markets, which have evolved
gradually in the West, have been grasped in the USSR mechanistically at
best, in a manner reminiscent of Soviet technology-borrowing during the
interwar period. Gorbachev and others have facilely spoken of these ideas
with little apparent awareness of the encrustations of time and tradition,
policy and practice, which have shaped their contemporary meaning in the
United States and the Western democracies.
Robert Sharlet, The Path of ConstitutionalReform, in PERESTROIKA-ERA POLITICS:
THE NEW SOvIET LEGISLATURE AND GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL REFORMS 22 (Robert T.

Huber & Donald R. Kelley eds., 1992).
59.
See AHDIEH, supra note 14, at 26.
See id. Of the 2250 seats in the Congress, 750 would be filled by
60.
"social organizations," that is, the Communist Party and its ancillaries. Id.
See id. at 27. Meanwhile, the Soviet people witnessed the drama live
61.
on television, their first chance to view the workings of government institutions.
See id.
See id. at 30-31. Among the laws the Congress passed were "the Law
62.
on Press and Other Mass Media (June 1990), the Law on Freedom of Conscience
and Religious Organizations (October 1990), and the Law on Public Associations

(October 1990)." Id. at 31. See also YAKOVLEV, supra note 35, at 76-78 (describing
legislative successes by the Congress and the Supreme Soviet).
For example, its large size (2250 deputies), that it was not bicameral,
63.

and its institutional underpinning on revolutionary institutions of the 1924
Constitution all contributed to the Congress' difficulties.
14, at 31.

See AHDIEH, supra note
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was elected in March 1990-in order to balance the legislative
power with a strong executive. 6 4 Consequently, as he began to
work constructively with the Congress, a "muted Soviet
separation of powers doctrine began to take shape ..
".."65
This
cooperation ultimately succumbed to the exigencies of domestic
crises, as Gorbachev "persuaded" the legislature to grant him
special emergency powers and significant new permanent
presidential powers, including the expansion of the authority to
issue decrees, in order to combat internal problems. 6 6 As a result
of Gorbachev's "increasingly arbitrary and controversial decrees,"
the reformed Soviet system suggested "nearly unchecked
67
presidential power."
The final judgment of the Congress of People's Deputies is
therefore mixed. While the period showed the potential for
legislative-executive cooperation and separation of powers in
Russia, the very existence of the Congress may have been due, as
in imperial times, to the whim of the tsar-in this case,
Gorbachev's desire to demonstrate to the West his democratic
68
intentions.

64.
Gorbachev overcame his earlier reservations about a proposed USSR
executive presidency after the Congress continued to assert its independence; he
therefore supported the executive as "an instrument of rule that ... would be at
once more responsive and powerful."
Id. at 29 (quoting Eugene Huskey,
Executive-LegislativeRelations, in EXECUTIVE POWER AND SOVIET POLITICS: THE RISE
AND DECLINE OF THE SOVIET STATE 98 (Eugene Huskey ed., 1992)). Yet a strong
executive was arguably necessary if the legislature was to succeed as a separate
branch of power. Alexander Yakovlev, a legal reformer who served in the
Congress, contended that the Soviet Union "needed a strong executive power to
ensure that the laws passed by the Supreme Soviet were implemented . .. .
YAKOVLEV, supranote 35, at 83.
65.
SHARLET, supra note 53, at 94; see also YAKOVLEV, supranote 35, at 85
("instituting the presidency... signified the beginning of the process of separating
the executive from the legislative branch of government").
66.
See SHARLET, supra note 53, at 95.
67.
Id. In addition to nearly unlimited decree-making powers, Gorbachev
obtained the power to dissolve parliament under certain circumstances, the
authority to suspend the Constitution, and the authority to impose various
degrees of martial law. See id. at 99. Indeed, as Sharlet notes, Gorbachev
eventually resembled the all-powerful tsar more than a "constitutional leader
mindful of the division of power within a constitutional system." Id. at 95.
68.
One Soviet legal critic contended that Gorbachev was not truly
committed to democracy and public participation, and that the Congress "was
'merely a facade Gorbachev could show off to the West to help him justify
demands for increased foreign aid." See AHDIEH, supra note 14, at 31-32 (quoting
an interview with Avgust Mishin).
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E. The Battle for a New Russian Constitution
Changes at the federal
mirrored at the republic
constitutional

amendments

level
level
made

in the Soviet Union were
in
Russia.69
Following
by

the

Russian

Supreme

Soviet 7"

in 1989, elections were held in 1990 for seats in the
Russian Congress of People's Deputies (RCPD), a parliamentary

institution

modeled

on

the

federal

body. 7 1

Its

primary

responsibility was to choose from its members a permanently
functioning parliament, the Supreme Soviet. 7 2
In addition, the
RCPD had the power to amend the Constitution, to overturn
decisions by the Supreme Soviet, and to appoint the chair and
members of a new Constitutional Court. 7 3
The RCPD amended the 1978 RSFSR Constitution to create a
Russian presidency in
1991-to which Boris Yeltsin was
popularly elected shortly thereafter-in an attempt to divide
74
legislative and executive powers into two coequal branches.

Although temporarily united against a

common foe-the

government-the

and

strong

legislature

equally

Soviet

powerful

president eventually squabbled once the Soviet Union collapsed at
the end of 1991. 7 - Neither branch could dissolve the other, and
although the president could issue decrees having the force of

69.
Russia was one of the 15 republics that constituted the USSR. See
ALEXANDER YAKOVLEV & DALE GIBSON, THE BEAR THAT WOULDN'T DANCE: FAILED
ATTEMPTS TO REFORM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 1 (1992). Its
official name was the Russian Soviet Federative Republic (RSFSR). See icL
70.
Russia, as one of the 15 constituent republics of the Soviet Union, in
1978 had adopted its own constitution, which was virtually identical to the federal
version.
Constitutions of the republics commonly replicated the Soviet
constitution currently in effect. See Jeffrey W. Hahn, Analyzing Parliamentary
Development in Russia, in

DEMOCRATIZATION

IN RUSSIA: THE DEVELOPMENT OF

LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS 13 (Jeffrey W. Hahn ed., 1996). Therefore, its legislative
and executive bodies mirrored those at the national level, with the Supreme Soviet
as the highest institution of state power in the republic. See id. at 13, 15.
71.
See id. at 15; see supra Part II.D. The RCPD consisted of 1068
deputies elected to five-year terms.
72.
See id. In its first session, the RCPD elected Boris Yeltsin as Chairman
of the Supreme Soviet. See id. at 16.
73.
See id. at 15.
74.
See id. at 17. Yeltsin and running mate Aleksandr Rutskoi were elected
to a five-year term. The election marked the first time in the nation's 1000-year
history that the Russian people were permitted to choose their leader
democratically.
75.
This is not to say that Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet were cooperative
partners until the fall of the Soviet government. As Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet, Yeltsin had been unable to obtain support for his legislative initiatives.
See id. Later, as President, Yeltsin failed to secure the nomination of Ruslan
Khasbulatov to Chairman of the Supreme Soviet until the August 1991 coup
changed the political landscape. See id. at 17-18.
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law, 7 6 such laws could not contradict the Constitution or laws
could
passed by parliament. 7 7 Moreover, the Supreme Soviet
78
Most
overrule a presidential veto by fifty percent majority.
significantly, however, was that until a new constitution could be
drafted, the President and parliament had agreed to operate
under the 1978 Constitution, a document reflecting the values of
the defunct communist system. 7 9 The situation meant deadlock
and eventual disaster. 80 Acrimonious and finally violent conflict
between President and parliament laid the groundwork for a
system allowing broad presidential action at the expense of the
8
legislature. '
Tensions mounted throughout 1992 as the economic
situation grew worse. 8 2 Yeltsin and the parliament collided in
December 1992 over the government's economic reforms, a
standoff that resulted in the appointment of Viktor Chernomyrdin
83
A
as Prime Minister, a candidate the deputies favored.
compromise brokered by the chairman of the Constitutional
Court allowed Yeltsin to call a referendum on a new constitution
in April 1993, but required the Supreme Soviet to approve the
questions.8 4 The compromise nearly collapsed in March 1993
when the President and parliament jousted over the renewal of
his emergency powers, originally granted in November 1991, with
Yeltsin threatening dissolution of the RCPD, then in session, and
The parliament
the parliament calling for impeachment. 8 5
ultimately acquiesced to the referendum, from which Yeltsin
emerged victorious.8 6 Yet the deadlock continued as the two

The Supreme Soviet granted Yeltsin this power through the end of
76.
1992. See id.
See id. at 17.
77.
See id.
78.
By 1992, the 1978 Russian
See SMITH, supra note 11, at 86.
79.
Constitution had been amended over 400 times, and "was filled with all the holes
and contradictions of a document long ago superannuated institutionally,
politically, and economically." AHDIEH, supranote 14, at 50-5 1.
See Hahn, supranote 70, at 17.
80.
See infra Part III.
81.
Yeltsin had freed prices from Soviet controls on January 1, 1992,
82.
resulting in 2500% inflation by the end of the year. Meanwhile, the government
also ended state subsidies to large, state-ran enterprises. See Hahn, supra note
70, at 18-19.
See id. at 19. The Supreme Soviet was dominated by old Communist
83.
Party elite who favored Chermomyrdin, a former minister of the state gas industry
thought to be much more conservative than Yeltsin's candidate, acting Prime
Minister Yegor Gaidar, a liberal reformer.
See id.
84.
See SMITH, supranote 11, at 91-92.
85.
More than 62% of Russia's 105.5 million eligible voters participated in
86.
the referendum, as 59% of voters expressed confidence in Yeltsin's leadership and
53% approved his socio-economic policies. See id. at 93. Meanwhile, only 40%
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sides argued over the powers delegated by draft constitutions
circulating during the summer of 1993.87 Thus, the debate
between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet represented not so much
a political battle over reforms, but an institutional struggle over
the future distribution of powers under a new constitution. 8
Buoyed by his success in the referendum and frustrated over
the legislature's intransigence toward the draft constitution,
Yeltsin forced a final showdown with the Supreme Soviet in
September 1993 by issuing a decree dissolving the parliament. 89
When heavily armed communist and nationalist deputies and
supporters refused to leave the parliament building, Yeltsin
surrounded them with security forces. 90
After parliamentary
leaders incited mob violence that resulted in the storming of the
Moscow mayor's office building and the state television broadcast
center, Yeltsin called in the armed forces, who launched artillery
91
fire on the parliament building.
With the rebellious parliament out of the way, Yeltsin was
free to introduce his proposed constitution, which created a
governmental system weighted toward the president. 92 Despite
the violence and abuse of presidential power, parliamentary
elections went forward in December as promised, and voters also
93
approved the new Constitution.

approved of early presidential elections while 74% favored early parliamentary
elections. See id
87.
See Bruce L.R. Smith, Constitutionalismin the New Russia, in LAW AND
DEMOCRACY IN THE NEW RussiA 1, 12 (Bruce L.R. Smith & Germady Danilenko eds.,
1993).
88.
See id. According to Smith, this
executive-legislative gridlock of 1992-1993 was created by disputes over
which branch would have the right to appoint and remove key officers of
government, which would have final budgetary power ...
. and which
would control the money supply ...
. Other disputes included how
extensive executive discretion would be . . . and who would control the
state television stations.
Id.
89.
See Hahn, supra note 70, at 20-21. In the decree, Yeltsin promised to
hold elections to a new Federal Assembly on December 12, 1993. See id. In a
television address announcing the decree, Yeltsin declared that Russia was
"experiencing a profound crisis of its state structure." AHDIEH, supra note 14, at
66 (quoting Yeltsin's Address on National Television, official Kremlin international
news broadcast, Sept. 21, 1993 availablein LEXIS, News Library, Sovnws File).
90.
See NIKOLAI BIRYUKOV & VICTOR SERGEYEV, RUssIAN POLITICS IN
TRANSITION 199 (1997).
91.
See id. at 190-207 (giving a synopsis of the events of SeptemberOctober 1993); see also DAVID REMNICK, RESURRECTION 59-80 (1997) (providing a
journalistic account of Yeltsin's showdown with parliament).
92.
See infra Part HIL.
93.
See SMITH, supra note 11, at 102. Smith notes, however, that "[o]nly
54.8 percent of registered voters bothered to cast ballots, and, of those, 58.4
percent supported the new constitution." Id. Thus, "only about 31 percent of all
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III. EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS INTHE
NEW RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION
Under Yeltsin's new Constitution, while the president retains
broad authority in directing the affairs of the country, the
legislature possesses some means, albeit weak, of checking
executive power and enacting legislation. 9 4 Despite increasing
public discussion of such concepts as separation of powers and
the rule of law, however, centuries-old political traditions such as
centralized authority and the circumvention of the law by
officials, as well as the violent confrontations of 1993, meant that
the new Constitution would imbue the president with strong
95
executive powers.
A. Basic Structure
The 1993 Russian Constitution prescribes a governmental
system roughly similar to the American model, although its
strong presidential powers echo those granted in the French
Constitution. 9 6 It separates the executive, legislative, and judicial
powers into three ostensibly coequal branches. 9 7 The executive is
essentially a dual executive, with the president on one hand and
the government, led by the prime minister, on the other. 98 The
legislative branch is divided into two chambers: the Federation
Council (upper house) and the State Duma (lower house).9 9

eligible voters supported the new constitution." Id. Popular support for the
Russian Constitution therefore should not be overstated.
94.
See infra Part II.C.
95.
See SHARLET, supra note 53, at 98 (indicating that "a number of
traditional Russian and Soviet methods of governance remained fundamentally
unchanged in spirit [since they were] deeply ingrained in the elite political
culture"); see also supra Parts II.A-C.
96.
See Ninel S. Krylova, The New Constitution of Russia: Main Principles
and Features, 27 AKRON L. REV. 397, 403-04 (1994). The French Constitution
incorporates a mixed presidential-parliamentary regime. See generally La
Constitution (Fr.) (1958).
97.
See KONST. RF chs. 4, 5, 7.
98.
See id. arts. 110, 111.
99.
See id. art. 95(1). The Federation Council includes two representatives
"from each constituent entity [autonomous and semi-autonomous republics and
regions of the Russian Federation listed in art. 65(1)] of the Russian Federation,
one from the legislative and one from the executive State government body." Id.
art. 95(2). The Duma consists of 450 popularly elected deputies. See id. art.
95(3).
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-B. Powers of the Executive
Subject to the approval of the Duma, the president has the
power to appoint the prime minister and to appoint and remove
the chairman of the Central Bank, the treasury.10° The president
may also appoint and remove deputy ministers of the
government, all ministers below the position of prime minister,
without Duma approval.' 0 1 In addition, the president has the
°2
power to appoint and dismiss plenipotentiary representatives1
and supreme commanders of the armed forces' 0 3 without
consulting the Federal Assembly.
If the Duma rejects the president's candidate for prime
minister three times, the president must appoint the candidate,
dissolve the Duma, and call for new elections.104 The president
may also dissolve the Duma if it passes two no-confidence
motions against the government within three months, or if the
prime minister raises the issue of confidence in the government
before the Duma and the Duma passes a no-confidence
motion.' 0 5 The Constitution, however, restricts the president
from dissolving the Duma in four circumstances: (1) during the
year following the Duma's election;' 0 6 (2) during impeachment
proceedings;' 0 7 (3) while a state of emergency or martial law is in
effect;' 0 8 or (4) within six months prior to the conclusion of the
president's term in office. 109
As in the U.S. system, the president signs and promulgates
federal laws passed by the Assembly. 1 10 The president also has
the power to veto a law within fourteen days of receiving it from
the Assembly."' In a clear violation of the principle of separation
of powers, however, the president also has the authority to
submit draft laws to the State Duma. 1 12 Moreover, the president

100.
See id. arts. 83(a), (d).
101.
See id. art. 83(e).
102.
See id. art. 830).
103.
See id.art. 83(k).
See id. arts. 111(4), 109(2) (requiring the president to call for new
104.
elections within four months after the dissolution).
105.
See id. art. 117(3). Alternatively, the president may accept the motion
and announce the resignation of the government.
106.
See id. art. 109(3).
107. See id.art. 109(4). This includes the period beginning from the time
the Duma brings charges against the president until the Federation Council
adopts a decision on the issue. See id.
108.
See id. art. 109(5).
109.
See id.
110.
See id. art. 84(e).
111.
See id. art. 107(3).
112.
See id. art. 84(d).
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may issue "edicts and regulations" having the force of law, as long
113
as they do not conflict with the Constitution and federal laws.
Thus, the president may circumvent entirely the Federal
Assembly and the legislative process.
The president may declare "a state of emergency in the
territory of the Russian Federation or in certain parts thereof"and
only need notify the Federation Council and the Duma
"immediately" afterward. 1 14 Following such a declaration, the
president may dissolve parliament and subsequently issue
decrees and other executive directions where implementation is
5
mandatory throughout the Russian Federation. 11
C. Powers of the Legislature
Although a distinctly junior partner in the Russian
governmental system, the legislature nonetheless possesses
certain constitutionally-defined powers that certainly exceed
those of the original tsarist-era State Duma. 1 16 As noted above,
the Duma must approve the president's nominee for prime
minister. 117 The Duma also must approve the nomination of, and
has the power to remove, the chairman of the Central Bank. 118
The "right of legislative initiative" belongs to both the
Federation Council and the Duma, although Article 104 grants
this right essentially to every major governmental branch. 119
Thus, the separation of powers is thoroughly diluted; the Federal
Assembly does not have a monopoly on legislative power, as the
Congress does in the U.S. system. 120 Nevertheless, the Duma
ultimately must approve federal laws by majority vote, then
submit such laws to the Federation Council for "examination."' 2 '

113. Id. art. 90.
114. Id. art. 88.
115. See id. arts. 84(b), 87(2), 90; see also infra note 153.
116. See supranotes 32-37 and accompanying text.
117. See KONsT. RF art. 103(1)(a).
118. See id. art. 103(1)(c).
119. Id. art. 104(1). The president, "the Federation Council, members of the
Federation Council, deputies of the State Duma, the Government of the Russian
Federation, and legislative" bodies of constituent entities of the Russian
Federation all have the power to initiate legislation. Id
In addition, the
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Arbitration Court may
all "initiate legislation on the matters within their respective terms of reference."

Id.
120. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives").
121. KONST. RF art. 105(1)-(3). If a majority of the Federation Council
members vote for the law, or if the law remains unexamined for 14 days, the law
will be considered as adopted. See id. art. 105(4). If the Council rejects the law,
the two chambers "may set up a reconciliatory commission to settle the dispute;"
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An adopted federal law must then be submitted to the president
for signing and promulgation. 122 If the president vetoes the law,
the Duma may override with a two-thirds majority vote, in which
case the president must sign and promulgate the law. 123
The Duma has the power to "decide[] the issue of confidence
in the Government of the Russian Federation." 12 4
Such a
resolution needs only a simple majority of the total number of
deputies in the Duma. 125 The Duma, however, must be cautious
with such votes, for in certain circumstances the president may
dissolve the Duma and call for new elections following a noconfidence vote. 126
Because the president and his advisers were the main
authors of the Constitution, its impeachment provisions make
removal of the executive from office extremely difficult. 127
Nevertheless, that such provisions for lawful removal of an
authority figure even exist in a Russian Constitution signifies a
major development in Russian history.
Article 93 states that the president may be impeached "on
the basis of charges of high treason or of another grave crime." 128
A special commission set up by the Duma must first issue a
resolution on the charges, and then one-third of the deputies
must pass an initiative regarding the charges before the Duma
may consider bringing charges against the president.1 2 9
The
Duma must then approve the charges by a two-thirds majority
vote.1 30 Following the Duma vote, first the Supreme Court must
issue a resolution "on the existence of indications of a crime in
the actions of the President," and then the Constitutional Court

the Duma may then reconsider the law. Id. Upon reconsideration, if the Duma
approves the law by a two-thirds majority, the law will be considered as adopted.
See id. art. 104(5).
122. See id. art. 107(1).
123. See id- art. 107(3).
124. Id. art. 103(b).
125. See id. art. 117(3).
126. See id. art. 117(3)-(4); supraPart II.B.4.
127.
Yeltsin's team . . . [has] construct[ed] a 'presidential vertical'
without any checks and balances ....
According to the new constitution,
drafted after Yeltsin's crackdown on the parliament and reflecting the
president's vast ambitions, not only the legislature, but the Constitutional
Court as well, have become mere decorations. Thus, parliament is
deprived of the right to form a government, while the process for
impeaching the president is so complicated that it becomes virtually
impossible.
Lilia Shevtsova, Parliamentand the PoliticalCrisis in Russia, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN
RUSSIA, supranote 70, at 43.
128. KoNsT. RF art. 93(1).
129. See id. art. 93(2).
130. See id.
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must confirm that "the1 established procedure for bringing charges
13
has been observed."
Once these resolutions have been issued, the Federation
Council is to consider the charges and can impeach the president by
two-thirds majority vote. 13 2 If the Federation Council fails to adopt
its decision within three months after the Duma brings charges, the
charges will be "regarded as having been declined." 133 Thus, the
Constitution imposes not only lengthy procedural requirements, but
also a strict time limit on impeachments, requirements that serve to
protect the president from virtually any impeachment attempt.
Once impeached, the president is required to "cease ... exercis[ing]
13 4
his powers ... ."

IV. CHECKS AND BALANCES IN ACTION: THE PRESIDENT VERSUS

PARLIAMENT,

1994-1999

Relations between Yeltsin and the Duma in the six years
since the adoption of the 1993 Constitution were characterized by
nearly constant bickering, often flaring up into fierce
confrontation. Yet each side largely framed its positions within
the guidelines of the Constitution; neither engaged in extraconstitutional means to resolve disputes as Yeltsin did in 1993.
The two major showdowns between the executive and legislative
branches in 1998, centering on the selection of a new prime
minister, clearly demonstrate the various weapons each branch
can employ to check the other. 13 5 Ultimately-and surprisingly,
given the president's broad authority to act-the Duma emerged
from the conflict with the upper hand-although in the end, only
temporarily-having secured its preferred candidate over
Yeltsin's. 136 That the Duma emerged intact at all was a victory in
itself. By challenging the president's authority in such matters,
the Duma risked dissolution.' 3 7 Nevertheless, by the summer of
1999, the Duma returned to its former stature as a grudgingly

131. Id. art. 93(1).
132. See id. art. 93(2).
133. Id. art. 93(3).
134. Id. art. 92(2). It should be noted that the Constitution does not
specifically state that the president is to be "removed" from office following
impeachment. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II., § 4 ("The President ... shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
High Crimes and Misdemeanors"). This may be a moot point, as removal from
office is probably implied in the words "to cease to exercise his powers." KONST.
RF art. 92(2).
135.
See infra Parts IV.B-C.
136.
See infra Part V.C.
137.
SeeKONST.RFart. 111(4).
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acquiescent body, as it backed down from impeachment and
138
approved a succession of Yeltsin's prime ministers.
An examination of the two stages of the 1998 conflict shows
that constitutional imbalances of power on paper may be
13 9
mitigated or exacerbated by personalities and external events.
That is, the Russian Constitution of 1993 is flawed not because of
its imperfect separation of powers but because its effectiveness
ultimately relies upon the individuals occupying the various
offices of state power and much less upon the ideals on which the
Constitution is based. Such a document requires amendmentwhile this situation was tolerable with a generally reformist
Yeltsin as president, it could become disastrous with more
reactionary or authoritarian leader in power, as Vladimir Putin
may prove to be. 14 ° Meanwhile, those advocating democratic
reform in Russia find themselves trapped in a paradox. Support
for a traditional democratic separation of powers between the
legislative and executive branches in Russia would give the
communist-nationalist-dominated Duma an increased role in
setting the future of the country, which could well lead to the
destruction of any kind of a democratic system in Russia. Yet to
enable Russia to advance toward a democratic, capitalist system
demands that democrats turn a blind eye to the imbalance of
powers granted by the Constitution.
A. Uneasy Cooperation:u 1994-1997

Given the violence surrounding the adoption of the new
Constitution 1 4 1 and the subsequent election of a Duma
dominated by opposition parties, the president in this era was
virtually guaranteed a fractious relationship with the legislative
branch. Indeed, the Duma almost immediately confronted Yeltsin

138.
See infra Part IV.D.
139.
Lilia Shevtsova, a Russian political analyst at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, explains that "fe]verything depends not on checks and
balances, but on personalities." Mark Whitehouse & Betsy McKay, Filling the
Void: Yeltsin May Be 1l, But No Consensus Exists on Succession, WALL ST. J.
EUROPE, Oct. 30, 1998, at 1.
140.
See Chrystia Freeland, All Bets Are Off, Fin. Times (London), Aug. 29,
1998, at 10 (quoting Mikhail Burger, '[Ilf Zyuganov or some dangerous madman
were to become president under the current constitution, it would be the end of
true democracy.
But only an outgoing president will agree to weaken the
president's constitutional powers, and that is why Yeltsin's role is so crucial.");
Still Most Awkward Partners,ECONOMIST, May 9, 1998, at 21, 23 ("Yeltsin's decline
may well make the main institution of government, the presidency, a force more
for instability than for stability ....
The accession of either [General Alexander
Lebed or Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov] would create expectations dangerous
enough to be destabilizing in themselves.").
141.
See supranotes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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by granting amnesty both to the coup leaders of the August 1991
plot to overthrow Gorbachev, as well as to the occupants of the
parliament building in September-October 1993.142 Yet despite
the arguable unconstitutionality of the act, 143 the president
allowed the amnesty and refrained from further provocation of the
Duma. 1 4 By acting in deference to stability and cooperation, the
president set a constructive tone for the new Russian
constitutional republic. 145

1. Budget Battles
During these first years of the Second Russian Republic, the
annual budget debate allowed the president and parliament to
demonstrate both confrontation and compromise. Although the
1996 budget was approved by New Year's Day, 14 6 the 1995 and
1997 budgets passed the Duma's scrutiny in the spring, only
after five months of acrimonious haggling. 14 7 The two sides
differed over the extent of governmental spending. The president
sought to temper the state's outlays, under pressure from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), while the Duma generally
attempted to expand social programs to placate its impoverished
electoral power base. 148 Each branch nonetheless engaged in a
process of discussion and amendment of spending proposals,

142.
See AHDIEH, supranote 14, at 121.
143. While Article 103(1)(i) of the Constitution gives parliament the power to
grant amnesty, in this case since no trial had yet been held, the Duma's action
more closely resembled a pardon, a power granted the president under Article
89(c). See id. at 121-22.
144. Yeltsin initially tried to prevent the release of the plotters, causing two
political allies to resign in protest, but ultimately accepted the premise that to
acquiesce with the Duma would protect the country's stability. See id. at 122.
145.
See Steven Erlanger, Yeltsin Denounces Amnesty But Concedes to
Parliament, N.Y. TItMES, Mar. 5, 1994, at AS (quoting Yeltsin's statement to the
Duma, "[t]oday in Russia, democracy means above all stability, order and
cooperation").
146.
See Russia Starts New Year With Approved Budget, Moscow TIMES,
Jan. 4, 1996. The budget was passed by the Duma on December 6, and by the
Federation Council on December 19. See id. The debate was nonetheless time
consuming; Yeltsin had submitted the draft budget in June 1995, anticipating
difficulties in passing a budget after parliamentary elections in December. See
Natasha Mileusnic, Yeltsin Unveils Plansfor Early, Austere Budget, Moscow TIMES,
June 23, 1995.
147.
See Leonid Bershidsky, President Signs 1995 Budget, Moscow TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1995; Christian Lowe, '97 Budget Passes After Acrimonious Debate,
Moscow TIMES, Feb. 13, 1997.
148.
See Euan Craik, Stakes in Duma Budget Debate: Cash or Chaos,
Moscow TIMES, Jan. 25, 1995 (describing the relationship between the IMF and
the Russian budget debate); Leonid Bershidsky, Duma Passes Budget With a Sting
in the Tail, Moscow TIMES, Jan. 26, 1995 (reporting on the Duma's approval of a
version of the government's budget, but which was tied to a minimum wage hike).
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Unfortunately, while the policy debates over the budget
would appear to promote democratic discourse in Russia, 15 0
external realities and the constitutional imbalance of powers both
serve to undermine that potential benefit. Duma deputies and
Federation Council representatives alike recognize the necessity
of passing a workable budget in order to prove to the IMF and to
voters that Russia could manage its own finances. 15 1 Moreover,
the economic situation in post-Soviet Russia does not permit the
parties to hold the budget hostage for political gain.1 5 2 Other
deputies, however, note the ability of the president to circumvent
the budget approval process by issuing decrees. 153 As a result,
the process appears to be more of a perfunctory exercise in
democracy and the rule of law, rather than a means of
implementing concrete policies. Nevertheless, that the president
and the Duma engage in the process demonstrates a deference to
constitutional procedures, and to that end, suggests future
institutional stability.
2. Legislation
Russia's new Land Code was one of the primary contentious
issues dividing the executive and legislative branches, accordingly
demonstrating the ability of the president to fill in legislative gaps
left by the Duma. i5 4 In March 1996, while the Duma debated a

149.
See Russia Starts New Year With Approued Budget, Moscow TIMES,
Jan. 4, 1996.
150.
As Mstislav Afanasyev, deputy director of the government's Economic
Reform Center, explained to the Moscow Times, "[t]he budget, despite all the
squabbling, conflicts and debates around it, is an integrating force ....
It's a way
for all political forces and lobby groups to thrash out their differences in the open,
rather than fighting under the rug." Leonid Bershidsky, Budget: The Duma's
PoliticalFootball,MOSCOW TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995.
151.
See id. The Duma's passage of the budget is "needed to present a solid
front to the West, and to persuade international lending institutions that the
budget is legitimate." Id.
152. In 1997, the Federation Council approved the budget despite grave
concerns about its legitimacy, because otherwise the bill would have had to return
to the Duma for amendment, requiring several more weeks of debate. See Lowe,
supra note 147. Practical concerns motivated some deputies: the chairman of one
Council committee explained that "[g]iven the temporary absence of the president
[who was recovering from heart surgery], and the temporary absence of the
budget, there is no sense in adding to the power vacuum." Id.
153.
During the 1995 debates, one Communist deputy told his colleagues,
"[tlhere will be no tragedy if we don't pass the budget ....
The president must
take responsibility and sign decrees on financing the economy in the second and
third quarter of the year." Bershidsky, supranote 147.
154.
The new Land Code is intended to reverse the Soviet-era ban on private
ownership of agricultural land, thus allowing Russian citizens to buy and sell land
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draft of the Land Code, which had already progressed through the
first reading of the bill, the President issued a decree allowing
private ownership of agricultural land, thereby preempting the
legislature's activity.1 5 s
Legislators protested, citing an
agreement with the President that the Duma would pass the code
by April. 15 6 Yet Yeltsin's decree was valid under Article 90, which
allows the president to issue "edicts and regulations [that do] not
conflict with the Constitution... and federal laws." 157 Since the
Duma had not yet passed a law on the subject of land reform,
158
Yeltsin's decree arguably was not in violation of federal law.
Moreover, although Article 76(2) states that land ownership
questions must be decided by federal laws, a presidential decree
is apparently deemed to have the force of law.159 The decree
would remain valid until the Duma passed legislation overriding
it. 160

The Duma succeeded in passing its own land code in mid1997, which the President vetoed.161 Upon the Duma's override
of his veto, however, an enraged Yeltsin threatened the Duma,
"Let the Duma think about what the president should do in such
a case." 162 The stalemate over the Land Code, coupled with the
Duma's threatened removal of the President earlier in the year,
and the impending 1998 budget battle 16 3 contributed to an
October 1997 showdown between the two branches in which the
Duma prepared to pass a no-confidence motion against the

freely.

See Leonid Bershidsky, Yeltsin Shifts, Signs Sweeping Land Decree,

Moscow TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996.

155.
See id.
156.
See id.
157.
KONsT. RF art. 90.
158.
See Natasha Mileusnic, Land Decree Holds Legal Water, Moscow TIMES,
Mar. 19, 1996.
159.
See id. Article 72(1)() indicates that land legislation is within the joint
jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and its constituent entities. KONST. RF art.
72(1)(0). Article 76(2) then states that laws regarding all issues under such joint
jurisdiction must be promulgated in accordance with federal laws. Id. art. 76(2).
Thus, a presidential land decree is only legal if it has the authority of federal law.
160.
As one Russian attorney explained, "[s]trictly spealdng, if [the Land
Code] is a federal law and adopted after the decree, then it should supercede the

latter." Id.
161.
See Dimitry Zaks, President Threatens Dismissal of Duma, Moscow
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997.
162. Id.
Compare Yeltsin's reaction to his later statements during the
March-April 1998 crisis, infra note 177 and accompanying text.
163.
See Zaks, supranote 161. Yeltsin's illness in late 1996 and early 1997
had emboldened opposition deputies, who openly called for his resignation. See
id. Since his return to activity in the spring of 1997, the president had made clear
his hostility to the Duma's threats, promising to hit back at the Duma for
attempting to force his resignation. Id.
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government.164 After a personal appeal from Yeltsin, following
threats of dissolution, the deputies backed down and once again,
the executive had its way. 16S
3. The First Chechen War
The divisive Chechen War of 1994-1996 clearly demonstrated
the vast authority that the Constitution confers upon the
executive and the ability for the president to transcend that
constitutional authority. 16 6
In sending troops into battle, the
President acted without consulting parliament and without
declaring either martial law or a state of emergency in the
Chechen republic.16 7 As Robert Sharlet commented, "In effect,
the troops marched under order of the supreme commander and
guarantor of the Constitution 'to restore constitutional order' in
16 8
Chechnya."
Executive excesses were balanced somewhat by a legislature
that displayed independence and initiative in confronting the
president's aggression in Chechnya. During the war, the Duma

164. See Christian Lowe, Duma Retreats on No-Confidence Vote, Moscow
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1997.
165. See id. Yeltsin told the Duma not to put him in a "complicated
situation" and guaranteed that "the government will learn lessons from the
criticism it has heard about itself." Id. Ultimately, the Federation Council refused
to back the Duma's veto override, thus leaving the president's 1996 decree as the
standing law. See Christian Lowe, Kremlin Presses in Budget Debate, Moscow
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1997.

166. See Sharlet, supranote 5, at 514-20. In December 1994, Yeltsin sent
Russian troops into the secessionist southern province of Chechnya, which had
long resented Moscow and had been a haven for organized crime. See id. at 514.
What first appeared to be a quick but costly Russian victory eventually became a
Chechan rout, as a humiliated Russian military was forced to withdraw in 1996.
See id. at 514-16.
167. Sharlet describes the constitutional powers at issue:
The Constitution describes the president as the guarantor of the
Constitution of the Russian Federation.' In that capacity, he is expected to
adopt measures 'to safeguard . . . state integrity' [under Art. 80(2)]. The
deployment of troops by the president as supreme commander [under Art.
87(1)] within the Russian Federation under either martial law [under Art.
87(2)] or a state of emergency [under Art. 88] requires immediate
notification to both houses of the Federal Assembly. A declaration of
martial law by the president is justified only in 'the event of aggression'
[under Art. 87(2)]. A state of emergency can be declared at a lower
threshold unspecified in the Constitution [under Art. 88]. Both regimes,
including the 'circumstances' justifying a state of emergency, are defined
by Tederal constitutional laws' [under Arts. 87(3), 88].
Id. at 516. When Yeltsin acted in December 1994, however, no such federal laws
had been enacted. Id. at 516-17. Neither did the president seek the Federation
Council's confirmation of his decrees on martial law or a state of emergency, as
required by Articles 102(b) and 102(c). Id. at 517.
168. Id.
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made its first attempts to amend the Constitution to avoid similar
future executive actions, 169 initiated a legislative investigation
into the crisis, passed its first motion of no-confidence in the
government, considered several impeachment motions against the
President, and filed petitions in the Constitutional Court for
review of the President's actions in Chechnya.170 In short, the
Duma attempted to check the President with whatever limited
means were at its disposal. Although the executive holds most of
the cards, the legislature nevertheless showed an unwillingness
to fold.1 7 1 In one instance, the parliament scored a minor victory
over the executive.
The Duma voted no-confidence in the
government in June 1995 and intended to follow up with a
second such vote within two weeks. 172
Instead of taking a
hardline stance against the parliament, however, the President
fired three of "his most hawkish ministers;" mollified, the Duma
backed off. 17 3
B. The March-April 1998 Crisis
Yeltsin demonstrated the breadth of his powers on March 23,
1998, when he suddenly fired Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin
and his entire thirty-member cabinet.17 4 The President acted on the
authority granted to him in Article 83 of the Constitution, which
gives the executive the power to "appoint ... Deputy Chairmen of
the Government of the Russian Federation and federal ministers and
remove them from office." 17 5 Within a week, Yeltsin had officially
nominated Chemomyrdin's successor, Sergei Kiriyenko, an
unknown thirty-five-year-old Fuel-and-Oil Minister in the recently

169. For example, the Duma proposed to increase "the scope of official
appointments subject to the Duma's consent, [to] establish[ ] a parliamentary
research institute to enhance its ability to control the Government and individual
ministries, and [to] broaden[ ] the possibility of a no-confidence motion not only on
the Government as a whole, but in individual members of the cabinet as well." Id.
at 517 n.89.
170. See id at 517-18.
171. See id. at 520. Indeed, it could be said that the legislative branch
"found its voice in the Chechen crisis," and that as a result, a "system of nascent
checks and balances began to emerge between the power branches." Id.
172. See AHDIEH, supra note 14, at 125.
173. Id.
174. See Richard C. Paddock, After FiringHis Cabinet, Yeltsin Callsfor 'New
Views,' L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998, at Al. The President did not explain his
reasons for the dismissal, but noted that "the government must move more
aggressively to improve the living conditions of the Russian people." Id. Some
speculated that Yeltsin especially wanted to sack Chernomyrdin, fearing the prime
minister would soon present a challenge to Yeltsin's own power. See id.
175. KONsT. RF art. 83.
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sacked cabinet. 176 In announcing Kiriyenko's nomination, Yeltsin
reminded the Duma of his constitutional powers to dissolve the
legislative body: "I'm just saying as president, save time, confirm him
quickly .... If you reject him once, twice, three times, then the
By nominating an arguably
fourth time means dissolution." 177
unqualified candidate for prime minister 178 and by threatening the
Duma with dissolution, Yeltsin appeared to be attempting to
manufacture a crisis to force the Duma's dissolution and to affirm
for the nation that as president, he was Russia's unopposed

leader. 179
Such action, while provocative, is entirely within the bounds
of the Constitution. The Duma could disapprove of Kiriyenko, but
only at the risk of committing political suicide.1 8 0 Nonetheless,
many in the Duma reacted defiantly to Yeltsin's heavy-handed
tactics, with the Communists in particular proclaiming that they
would not vote for Kiriyenko. 18 1
Despite the discord, both sides displayed the potential for
compromise. On April 2, Yeltsin met with Duma leaders at his
country residence to discuss Kiriyenko's nomination and opened
the door to negotiations over the composition of the future
cabinet, which hitherto had not been an option.' 8 2 As a further
concession, Yeltsin agreed to postpone the vote on Kiriyenko until

176. See Paddock, supra note 174, at Al; Tom Whitehouse, Duma Dared by
Yeltsin to Reject PM, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 28, 1998, at 16.
177. Whitehouse, supra note 176, at 16. Yeltsin added, "I dare you not to
approve [Kiriyenko's candidacy in the Duma]." See Vera Kuznetsova, Russia Widl
Have a Very Young Prime Minister, RUSS. PRESS DIG., Mar. 28, 1998. Actually,
Yeltsin misspoke, as the Constitution requires the president to dissolve the Duma
after the third negative vote against the prime ministerial nominee. See KONST. RF
art. 111(4).
178. See Richard Beeston, Communists to Reject 'Immature' Yeltsin Nominee,
TIMES (London), Mar. 30, 1998, at 11. Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov
voiced this concern in opposing Yeltsin's actions, saying, "[w]e cannot confirm just
anyone for the country's second most important post . .

.

. To trust such an

unknown and immature figure would be the height ofirresponsibility ..." Id.
179. See Kuznetsova, supranote 177 ("Yeltsin's categorical demand that the
Duma approve Kiriyenko's candidacy shows that he is really ready to dissolve the
Parliament if it does not obey him"); Alan Philps, Yeltsin Accused of Coercion over
Prime Minister, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 28, 1998, at 15 ("Mr. Yeltsin
seems driven to prove to the world that, despite his clearly failing health, he can
tighten his grip on power . .

.

. [B]y having a technocrat as prime minister,

[Yeltsin] will be solely in charge of the country").
180. SeeKONsT. RFart. 111(4).
181.
See James Meek, Communists Dash Yeltsin's Plan, GUARDIAN (London),
Apr. 3, 1998, at 15. Nevertheless, many doubted the Communists' resolve should
a third vote become necessary. See id.
182. See Gleb Cherkasov & Sergei Aksenov, President Yeltsin Suddenly
Agrees To Hold "Round Table" Before Duma Vote on Sergei Kiriyenko as Russia's
New Prime Minister, RUSS. PRESS DIG., Apr. 3, 1998.
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Such
after the roundtable meeting scheduled for April 7.183
earlier
Yeltsin's
given
significant
especially
was
compromise
18 4
refusal to engage in any negotiation with the opposition.
Yeltsin thereupon delayed the clash with the Duma on the
morning of the vote by revoking his earlier nomination 1 8of5
Kiriyenko, but he resubmitted Kiriyenko's name the same day.
Meanwhile, opposition leaders appeared to seek a compromise by
suggesting their willingness to support Kiriyenko if he were to
reveal his planned cabinet composition or offer ministerial
positions to their party members. 186
The President's conciliatory gestures demonstrated that while
the Constitution grants the executive broad power to dissolve the
legislative branch, that power does not exist in a vacuum.
Certainly, the ability to remove a rival authority from government
confers upon the executive a means of exerting substantial
pressure upon the legislature to do his bidding; yet even the
president must consider the politics of the situation.1 8 7 Indeed,
as Communist leaders believed during the April crisis, early
parliamentary elections following dissolution would likely result
Unfortunately,
in a Duma even more opposed to Yeltsin.1 8 8
conciliation was short-lived, as Yeltsin ultimately refused to bow
to parliamentary cabinet proposals.
Nevertheless, the president may use the threat of dissolution
to great effect against the Duma, without ever having to pull the
trigger. Duma deputies enjoy substantial perks-comfortable
apartments in Moscow, 1 8 9 cut-rate meals, free health care, and

183. See id. The roundtable comprised Yeltsin, Kiriyenko, and the speakers
of each house of the Federal Assembly. See id.
184. See Ivan Rodin, Communists Found Allies in Presidential Entourage,
Russ. PRESS DIG., Apr. 4, 1998.
185. See Yeltsin Avoids Clash on Choicefor PM, INDEPENDENT (London), Apr.
4, 1998, at 16. In a letter to parliament, Yeltsin emphasized that he acted "for the
sake of preserving political stability and public accord." Id. Revocation and
resubmission of Kiriyenko's nomination would give the Duma another seven days
to consider the vote under Article 111(3). See KONsT. RF art. 111(3).
See Timothy Heritage, Yeltsin Brings Duma to the Brink, BIRMINGHAM
186.
POST, Apr. 14, 1998, at 9.
187. Yeltsin dismissed unpopular government ministers following Duma
protests on several occasions, for example, Finance Minister Anatoly Chubais,
who was criticized for suspicious financial dealings. See Christian Lowe, Chubais
To Lose Finance Ministry, Moscow TIMES, Nov. 20, 1997; see also infra notes 20103 and accompanying text.
See Heritage, supra note 186, at 9. Not only can the parliamentary
188.
opposition pressure the president, but the president's own advisers may counsel
their leader into less aggressive tactics, see id., thus suggesting that the new
Russian executive, despite broad authority, is less monolithic and more capable of
internal dissent than its tsarist or Soviet forebears.
189. Indeed, just to live in Moscow is a benefit to many deputies who hail
from the far reaches of the Russian Federation, where the modernity Moscow
offers is unknown.
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immunity from prosecution-that they would lose should the
Duma be dissolved. 190 Given Russia's bleak economic climate
since the adoption of the Constitution, many deputies therefore
are fearful of losing their jobs. 19 1 Thus is revealed one of the
crucial and most disturbing features of the president's broad
power-the ability to bribe the legislature to accept the executive's
position.
Yeltsin successfully played this card in the April
showdown, 19 2 although in the first two votes on Kiriyenko's
nomination many deputies were indignant about Yeltsin's
attempts to cajole them and therefore voted against the
nomination. 193 By the third and final vote on Kiriyenko, however,
the deputies were presented with a stark choice-vote for Yeltsin's
nominee or be thrown out onto the street. 194 The Duma approved

190.
See Seamus Martin, Deputies Are Likely to Support Yeltsin's Nominee at
a Price, IRISH TIMES, Apr. 23, 1998, at 16; Richard C. Paddock, Yeltsin's Pick for
Prime Minister Wins Approval, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1998, at Al (describing the
various perquisites available to Duma deputies).
191.
During the legislative-executive showdown over the land code in
October 1997, see supra note 164, one independent deputy described the horrified
reactions of Communist deputies when it appeared that reformer Grigory
Yavlinsky would support their no-confidence motion. See Jonas Bernstein, A
Show of No Confidence, Moscow TIMES, Oct. 17, 1997.
192. Yeltsin told an aide to consider the deputies' "other concerns," that is,
housing and other perks they enjoy in Moscow, although any benefits would wait
until after Kiriyenko's confirmation. Heritage, supra note 186, at 9; see also A
Man Without Qualities, ECONOMIST, Apr. 18, 1998, at 46 (reporting Yeltsin's order
to the "Kremlin official in charge of politicians' perks to 'solve the outstanding
problems' of Duma members-but only if they showed 'a constructive approach' in
[the] second vote on . - . Kiriyenko. They know what it's all about,' said Mr.
Yeltsin .... ."). The threatened loss of such perks-and the promise of bonuseshas motivated deputies in prior confrontations with the president. In October
1997, following the Duma's withdrawal of a no-confidence motion, Pravda
reported that "the President and Government have reportedly thanked the Duma
deputies for 'their understanding' by raising their monthly salary to six million
rubles and buying modem apartments for 152 deputies at the price of 275 million
rubles."
Olga Korolyova, Russian Left Opposition Split by Removal of NoConfidence in Government Motionfrom State Duma Agenda, RUSS. PRESS DIG., Oct.
23, 1997.
193.
See James Meek, Duma Plays Russian Roulette, GUARDIAN (London),
Apr. 18, 1998, at 2. A member of the main reformist party, Yabloko, complained
that Yeltsin "had tried to humiliate the Duma by suggesting publicly that deputies
could be bribed with flats, cars and other perks to support his man." Id.
According to the deputy, "I'm not against [Kiriyenko]. But the way the president
has presented him, the open manner in which he has attempted to bribe the
legislature, provokes a sense of having been insulted." Id.
194. Yeltsin continued to remind deputies of this choice. An official letter
circulated in the Duma two days before the third vote, "inform[ing] members that
in the event of dismissal, they would have to vacate their state-provided
apartments within three weeks, receive a one-way ticket home and a 10-ton
allowance for transporting their belongings." Daniel Williams, Premier Vote May
Seal Russian Legislature'sFate, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1998, at A34. Moreover, in
a televised comment, Yeltsin "ordered his staff to take care of the material needs of
members of parliament who backed Mr. Kiriyenko." Chrystia Freeland, And Now
for the Hard Part,FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 27, 1998, at 16.
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Kiriyenko by a wide margin, 251-25,19s largely as a result of the
cowardly maneuver of a secret ballot, which allowed Communist
deputies to break ranks with their leadership and vote for
19 6
Kiriyenko.
While threats to individual deputies' economic welfare
affected the votes of many members, political and legal concerns
motivated others. A dissolved Duma would leave the president
free to issue decrees, thereby passing legislation himself without
parliamentary resistance, for up to three months.197
Some
deputies appeared to weigh the effects of standing up to the
president's heavy-handed tactics now, against the unfettered
executive authority that would result following dissolution of the
legislature.198
The high-mindedness of these deputies is an
encouraging sign that the rule of law is slowly taking root in
Russia.
The Duma's susceptibility to coercion is damaging to the
prospects of constitutionalism and separation of powers for two
reasons. First, it allows the president to force his appointees and
policies through the legislature, thus relegating the Duma to a

195.
See Paddock, supra note 190, at Al. Contrast the final vote with the
first two votes in which Kiriyenko lost 143-186 and 115-271, respectively. See
Ivan Rodin, Kiriyenko's Candidacy Rejected by Duma with Hopeful Score, Russ.
PRESS DIG., Apr. 11, 1998; Meek, supranote 193, at 2.
196.
See At the Court of King Boris, ECONOMIST, May 2, 1998, at 47
(explaining that the secret ballot "spare[d] the blushes of defecting deputies.").
197.
See KONST. RF art. 109(2). Yeltsin had demonstrated his willingness to
fill a legislative void with decrees between the forced dissolution of the Soviet-era
parliament in October 1993 and the convening of the first Duma in January 1994.
See Thomas de Waal, Flurry of Yeltsin Decrees Fills Legislative Void, Moscow
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1994 (reporting that the president had signed 934 edicts between
September 21 and December 31, 1993). Although many of those decrees were
issued "in an effort to transform the political landscape before the next
parliament," id., and prior to the adoption of the current Constitution, Yeltsin in
April 1998 was equally likely to decree new electoral procedures for future Dumas,
further weakening the legislative branch. See Graham T. Allison, Showdown in
Moscow, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1998, at A25 (indicating that the president was
considering altering the procedures "to eliminate the party-list proportional
representation system now used to elect half the Duma in an attempt to "crush
the national political parties now emerging in Russia's proto-democracy and
thereby tame the Parliament").
198.
Explained the leader of the Agrarian Party faction in the Duma, "I
voted for the preservation of the Duma ....
We should not act like first-graders
who took their school bags and went home because of their resentment against
the teacher."
Paddock, supra note 190, at Al.
Duma Speaker Gennady
Seleznyov, a Communist, indicated he supported Kiriyenko because "'[t]he Duma's
fate is more important to me than the fate of Kiriyenko." Alan Philps, Yeltsin
Finds Support in Battle over Kiriyenko, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 15, 1998,
at 15.
Yuri Shchekochikhin, a liberal democrat and former investigative
journalist, explained his party's position, "'[w]e will not be voting against
Kiriyenko. We will be voting against the President. One cannot treat society the
way he does. One cannot threaten parliament or try to buy parliament the way he
does.' Martin, supra note 190, at 16.
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status little better than the rubber-stamping Supreme Soviet of
the Communist era. Even if the Duma had rejected Kiriyenko a
third time, Yeltsin would still have been able to appoint him, as
well as dissolve the Duma. 19 9 Indeed, time and again, Yeltsin has
brandished threats of dissolution when the Duma has opposed
his reforms, creating a troubling precedent. 2 oo
Second, and
perhaps equally problematic, is the impression left on the
Russian people of the Duma "as a bought, self-obsessed body
incapable of wielding its few powers. "20 1 Institutions founded in
law will have little chance of taking root in Russia if an already
apathetic electorate views the parliament as hopelessly weakstructurally and morally-and the president as uncompromisingly
202
strong.
Nonetheless, both sides in the dispute acted within the
confines of the Constitution, if only because that document allows
certain egregious behavior to take place. The Duma framed its
objections in constitutional arguments, for example, by appealing
to the Constitutional Court to rule whether the president has the
right to nominate the same prime ministerial candidate three
times. 20 3
One notable instance of constitutional restraint
occurred at the beginning of the crisis, when Yeltsin at first
proposed that he himself become acting prime minister until a
new candidate
could be confnmed. 2 ° 4
Yeltsin quickly

199. SeeKONST.RFart. 111(4).
200. See Zaks, supra note 161 (quoting Yeltsin's veiled threat after the
Duma overrode his veto--"[1jet the Duma think about what the president should
do in such a case."). In June 1998, faced with the Duma's hesitance to adopt a
package of government-sponsored emergency fiscal measures, Yeltsin warned,
"[a]ll the laws must be passed before the start of parliamentary recess .... And if
the package of laws envisioned in the program is not approved, other measures
will be taken." Richard C. Paddock, Yeltsin Issues Deadlinefor FiscalReform, L.A.
TIMES, June 24, 1998, at A6.
201. James Meek, Duma Does It Yeltsin's Way on New PM, GUARDIAN
(London), Apr. 25, 1998, at 17. The Russian media has added fuel to the fire, as
one foreign correspondent noted during the April crisis, "[m]ost of the mass
circulation Russian dailies have been carrying articles alleging that the cost of the
Duma's support will be $6000 per deputy in cash, the construction of a
parliamentary centre even more luxurious than the current Duma and the
procurement of larger apartments for the honourable members." Martin, supra
note 190, at 16. None of the interviewed deputies, however, "admitted to being
offered anything for their votes by Mr. Yeltsin or his associates..." Id.
202. As The Economist commented on the president's coercion of deputies,
"[ilt was hard to say whether this approach degraded Mr. Yeltsin or the Duma
more .... " At the Court of King Boris, supranote 196, at 47.
203. See Martin Nesirky, Duma Stands Firn in Battle with Yeltsin,
BIRMINGHAM PosT, Apr. 16, 1998, at 13. Voting on Kiriyenko was not delayed,
however, as the court indicated that it could not decide the issue for two months.
See id.
204. See Beeston, supranote 178, at 11.
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backtracked after he was warned of the unconstitutionality of
205
such a maneuver.
C. The August-September 1998 Crisis:
The High-WaterMark of the Duma
Angered by Yeltsin's victory in April, Duma deputies initiated
impeachment procedures against the President in May, accusing
him of high treason in engineering the breakup of the Soviet
Union and in organizing a coup in September 1993.206 The
opposition essentially viewed the President's entire reform
program as sufficient grounds for removal from office, claiming
that Yeltsin's policies and actions had "led Russia to a social and
economic crisis resulting in the destruction of the country's basic
industries, a growing stratification of society, the loss [of] national
security, a sharp drop in living standards and the extinction of
the population."20 7 Observers noted that political rather than
legal concerns motivated the impeachment proposal, as the
Communists were under pressure from constituents to condemn
Yeltsin and to show signs of atonement from their "opportunist
behavior" in the vote on Kiriyenko. 20 8 In June 1998, when the
Duma created a special commission to set a procedural
framework for impeachment, another potential motive became
clear-to shield the Duma from dissolution, as the president may
not dissolve the Duma while impeachment proceedings are
20 9
continuing against him.
The impeachment process was interrupted, but subsequently
fueled, by a second clash between Yeltsin and the Duma in
August 1998, when the President again sacked the Prime Minister
and cabinet and called former Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin back
to head the government.2 1 0
Given Russia's economic crisis

205.

See id.

206.

See Ivan Rodin, Duma Initiates Impeachment Procedure Against

President,Russ. PRESS DIG., May 21, 1998.
207. Id.
208.
Id. (suggesting that the motion was "simply a response to the demands
of striking workers on the eve of the emergency Communist convention scheduled
for May 23"); Ivan Rodin, Impeachment Affair is Being Delayed, Russ. PRESS DIG.,
June 2, 1998 (positing that the impeachment initiative was designed to head off
radical attacks on Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov).
209.
See KONST. RF art 109(4); Tatyana Romanenkova, Impeachment
Commission Starts Its Work, Russ. PRESS DIG., June 30, 1998. Indeed, the
Communists slowed the impeachment process during the summer, in order that
the Duma might address the issue in the fall after its recess, when the deputies
could take full advantage of the immunity from dissolution. See Sergei Aksyonov,
Impeachment Commission Is Brought Up to Strength, Russ. PRESS DIG., June 19,

1998.
210.
See Kathy Lally, Yeltsin Fires Entire Cabinet, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 24,
1998, at 1A.
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associated with loan defaults and the devaluation of the ruble,
the sudden cabinet reshuffle was less mysterious than Yeltsin's
similar action in March. 2 1 '
The president's broad powers
ultimately were outmatched by such economic and political
forces, paving the way for possible constitutional amendments
redrawing the lines of power among the branches of government.
Duma deputies from across the political spectrum smelled
blood and demanded a power-sharing agreement as a condition
for Chernomyrdin's approval. 2 12 The weakened president was
forced to negotiate with the Duma. A tentative agreement
proposed an eighteen-month truce between president and
parliament, during which neither branch would seek to oust the
other from power, and would give the prime minister, not the
president, the power to appoint cabinet ministers and the Duma
the authority to confirm them, in exchange for the Duma's
approval of Chernomyrdin as prime minister.2 1 3
The plan
collapsed just hours after its creation when the Communists, the
dominant party in the Duma, insisted that its terms be
incorporated into the Constitution.2 1 4
Many deputies were
skeptical of the President's intent to abide by an uncodified pact
after Chernomyrdin's approval by the Duma.2 15 Yeltsin in turn
withdrew his support from the accord, claiming that a
constitutional committee would need to convene for at least a
2 16
year before public discussion of any proposed amendments.
Ironically, the president's strong powers sealed the fate of the
compromise. Years of presidential blustering and heavyhandedness stemming from Yeltsin's essentially impregnable
position had created such an atmosphere of distrust that the

211. See id.
212. See James Meek, Yeltsin Redraws Political Map, GUARDIAN (London),
Aug. 25, 1998, at 2.
Opposition leaders proposed to "enshrine in law a
presidential pledge not to interfere in the government's work," and even demanded
a "complete change of economic course" in exchange for their support of
Chernomyrdin's candidacy. Id.
213. See Richard C. Paddock, Yeltsin and ParliamentStill in Flux over Crisis,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1998, at Al.
214. See id. The Communists demanded harsh new terms to the
agreement-Yeltsin's resignation after the new government is formed and the
inclusion of 10 ministers in the cabinet from opposition parties, including the
interior minister. See id.
215. See James Meek, Russian Deadlock after Yeltsin Backtracks, GUARDIAN
(London), Aug. 31, 1998, at 1. Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the liberal Yabloko
party, condemned the agreement, explaining that "[a]s soon as we vote for
Chernomyrdin, this piece of paper will be thrown in the bin." Id.
216. See id. Adherence to Yeltsin's timetable would mean that no
amendments would be enacted before the next presidential election in 2000. See
id.
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Duma could not take the president at his word. 2 17 Compromise
and conciliation has thus proven difficult, if not impossible, on
such an uneven playing field.
Following the collapse of the accord, the Duma resoundingly
defeated Chernomyrdin's nomination in its first vote, 251-94.218
Many Duma deputies-especially Communists and other leftist
parties-apparently did not fear early elections, anticipating
greater success, given citizen unrest fomented by the economic
crisis. 2 19 Thus, political realities emboldened a constitutionally
weak parliament and virtually emasculated a supposedly strong
president. At least in the current Russian political and economic
climate, external events appear to be the most significant check
on the executive power. 2 20 The president's broad authority is
thus unlike that which the tsars and the Soviets enjoyed, for the
executive under the new Russian Constitution must at some
point accede to the will of the people. 2 2 1 Unfortunately, the
president's need to listen to public opinion may ultimately only
arise when civil unrest is imminent.
Indeed, even during
economic collapse, Yeltsin viewed the parliament as obliged to
follow his wishes: "I insist that Chernomyrdin be confirmed as
prime minister as soon as possible ....
He is my candidate and I
will insist on it."

217.

2 22

Indeed, many parliament leaders dismissed the agreement, "citing

numerous past compromises with the Kremlin that had gone ignored." David
Filipov, LeadershipDeal Foiled in Russia, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 31, 1998, at Al.
218.
See David Filipov, Duma Votes Down Chernomyrdin, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 1, 1998, at A12. In contrast, the Federation Council indicated its support
for Chernomyrdin, 91-17, with 6 abstentions.
See id. The Council's vote,
however, was irrelevant to the appointment process, as only the Duma is
responsible for approving the prime minister. See KONST. RF art. 103(1)(a).
219.
See Filipov, supra note 218, at A12. As one Communist leader
declared, "[l]et Yeltsin [dissolve the Duma] and he will see that in three months,
the country will get a far more leftist parliament. We are ready for reelection. I
don't think Yeltsin is." Richard C. Paddock, Communist Leader Seeks Military's
Support, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1998, at A10; see also Mark Franchetti, Kingmaker
Zyuganov Tastes Power, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Sept. 6, 1998, at 19 ("Yeltsin's
popularity is at an all-time low and mass discontent would almost certainly play
into the hands of the communists"). Nonetheless, Communist leader Zyuganov
called for an agreement to resolve the deadlock, raising the specter of civil unrest
should the Duma fail to approve a candidate. See id.
220.
See, e.g., David McHugh, President Eyes New Premier Nominees,
MOSCOW TIMES, Sept. 10, 1998 (claiming that "the economic crisis and continuing
doubts about [Yeltsin's] health have sapped his prestige and thrown the initiative
to the legislative branch").
221. As a result, although the president may brandish threats of dissolution
against the Duma, the executive is constrained from sending a rival branch of
power home in a way that the tsar was not with regard to the original State Duma
in the early 1900s. See supranote 36-37 and accompanying text.
222.
Tom Whitehouse, Russia Crisis: Yeltsin and Duma Square Offfor Clash,
GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 2, 1998, at 11 (quoting Yeltsin). Asked if he would
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The Duma employed the constitutional provisions on prime
minister approval 2 23 in a politically mature fashion in the AugustSeptember crisis. By voting against Chernomyrdin's nomination,
the Duma opened the door for greater concessions from the
president-this time, however, in the form of political gains, not
self-interested perquisites. 2 2 4 On the eve of the second Duma
vote on Chemomyrdin, Yeltsin resubmitted the failed compromise
accord, offering to cede certain powers to parliament. 2 25 Finally,
following a second defeat of Chernomyrdin, 2 2 6 the president was
forced to nominate a new candidate more favorable to the Duma,
Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov.2 27 As a further concession,
Yeltsin signed an agreement promising to support constitutional
amendments that would expand the Duma's confirmation power
to include all cabinet members. 2 28 The approval process thus
actually proved constructive, as a new premier was installed
229
following political bargaining by the warring branches.
D. 1999: The Duma Retreats

Yeltsin's concessions appeared to mark the beginning of a
new era in Russian constitutionalism in which the executive is no
longer virtually omnipotent. Where once the president could
dominate the opposition in parliament, the economic situation in
Russia has chipped away at his authority. Moreover, given the
historical Russian attitude that compromise and conciliation
signify weakness, 23 0 the nomination of Primakov may have

dissolve the Duma and call new elections, Yeltsin responded, "'[i]f it behaves itself,
no."- Id.
223.
See KONST. RFart 111(4).
224.
See Richard Beeston, Duma Plays Russian Roulette with Yeltsin, TIMES
(London), Sept. 1, 1998, at 10. In April, the Duma used the protracted power
struggle to squeeze out additional perks.
See supra notes 192-94 and
accompanying text.
225.
See Richard Beeston, Yeltsin's Duma Battle Enters Second Round,
TIMES (London), Sept. 4, 1998, at 13. Specifically, Yeltsin offered the Duma the
power to approve all candidates for cabinet posts. See id.
226.
The Duma rejected Chernomyrdin by a vote of 273 to 138, nearly 100
votes short of the amount necessary for confirmation. See Richard C. Paddock, In
2nd Vote, Yeltsin's Candidateis Rejected, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1998, at Al.
227.
See David Hoffman, Diplomat Is Named Russian Premier, WASH. POST,
Sept. 11, 1998, at Al. The Duma almost immediately confirmed Primakov as
Prime Minister, by a vote of 315 to 63. See Richard C. Paddock, ParliamentOKs
Primakovfor Postof Russia Premier,L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1998, at Al.
228.
See Kathy Lally, Duma Strongly Backs Primakov as Russia's New Prime
Minister, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 12, 1998, at 15A. According to Article 103, the
Duma currently has the power to confirm only the prime minister and central
bank chairman. See id.
229.
See id.; Paddock, supranote 227, at Al.
230.
See AHDIEH, supra note 14, at 115-17; see also Anatoly Kostyukov,
Losses and Gains of Compromise Agreement Between President Yeltsin and

2000]

RUSSIAN LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONSHIP

signaled the beginning of a gradual draining, by political
agreement or formal constitutional amendment, of many
23
presidential powers to the Duma and even to the government. '
Finally, Yeltsin's surprise 1999 New Year's Eve resignation
perhaps indicates that even the executive is vulnerable. 2 32 This
precedent, however, may have repercussions for future Russian
presidents-just as George Washington's example of refusing to
seek reelection after two terms guided U.S. presidents for nearly
150 years, Yeltsin's precedent of failing to complete his term in
office may affect political calculations between future Russian
presidents and Dumas.
In October 1998, following Primakov's approval, the Duma
continued the impeachment hearings it had begun over the
summer. 2 3 3 By February 1999, the parliamentary commission
investigating the President's alleged crimes had taken the
unprecedented step of presenting its charges for a full vote in the
Duma to initiate formal proceedings.2 3 4 Although the chances of
removal of the President remained slim because of the
constitutional procedure, the Duma's threat of impeachment kept
pressure on the executive. With the Duma's powers still limited,
impeachment is one of the legislature's sole means of expressing
opposition to the president's policies. Accordingly, the Duma has
sought to amend the impeachment provisions to the Constitution
to make removal of the president easier. 23 5
Given the
parliament's frequent calls for impeachment, however, the
Russian executive is unlikely to acquiesce to such an amendment
236
in the near future.

Opposition Analyzed by Weekly, Russ. PRESS DIG., Oct. 30, 1997 (declaring that
"in the opinion of the Russian politicians, a concession is a sign of weakness").
231. "The conflict between the president and parliament will continue to
develop. And it wont be in a direction beneficial to Boris Yeltsin. Having
conceded once to the opposition, he will be forced to do so again and again,
gradually relinquishing power."
WHAT THE PAPERS SAY: Fair Weather as
Primakov 'MagicCarpet' Takes Off, Moscow TIMES, Sept. 12, 1998.
232.
See Phil Reeves, Yeltsin Resigns: End of an Era as a Russian Bear
Shuffles Off the World Stage, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 1, 2000, at 18.
233.
See Chloe Arnold, State Duma Makes Ken Starr Look Good, Moscow
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1998.
234.
See Impeachment Is Planned for March, Russ. PRESS DIG., Feb. 16,
1999.
235.
See Igor Vandenko, Duma Intensifies Offensive on Executive Power
Branch, Russ. PRESS DIG., Sept. 15, 1998 ("Duma deputies also intend to remove
the main obstacle in the way of the President's impeachment-the grounds for
launching the impeachment procedure."); see also supra notes 127-34 and
accompanying text.
236.
Moreover,
[C]hanging the constitution is a complicated process that requires nearunanimous agreement among legislators and regional leaders. In Russia's
fractious political world, such accord is unlikely ....
Already, different
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Yeltsin's increasingly apparent physical infirmities provoked
louder cries for his resignation.2 37 From September 1998 to
Yeltsin's resignation in December 1999, it was the Prime Minister,
not the President, who primarily conducted the affairs of state. 23 8
Meanwhile, the Duma's aggressive impeachment process signaled
less regard for presidential authority within the legislature. The
strong executive powers in the Constitution would thus appear to
be only as strong as the individual holding office. 23 9
More
significantly, with so much power in the hands of the executive
branch,

a

weakened

president

accordingly

diminishes

the

predictability and relative stability created by the Constitution.2 40
Despite the impeachment process, however, less acrimony

and greater conciliation characterized the months following the
September showdown. The Duma approved the 1999 budget,

despite its tight spending requirements, virtually unanimously
and with little debate.2 4 1 In early 1999, Primakov proposed a
peace plan among the branches of power, in which the Duma
would promise not to force dismissal of the Cabinet through a noconfidence vote, and the President would agree not to dismiss

sides are lobbying for different changes. The Communists want more
powers for parliament, while local governors want to secure more authority
for their regions.
Mark Whitehouse & Betsy McKay, Filling the Void: Yeltsin May Be Ill But No
Consensus Exists on Succession, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 30, 1998, at 1.
237.
See Christian Lowe, Stricken President Cancels Meetings, Moscow
TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1998; David McHugh, Zyuganov Fights Kremlin Over Yeltsin's
Sickness, Moscow TIMES, Nov. 3, 1998.
238.
See Masterly Inactivity, ECONOMIST, Oct. 31, 1998, at 55 (reporting that
"the president's own men say as much" that Primakov is running the country).
While the Constitution allows such temporary delegation of executive powers to
the prime minister in the event of the president's incapacitation, KONsT. RF art.
92(3), Yeltsin made no formal acknowledgement of a transfer.
239. As Yeltsin remained in ill health, Primakov-and later Putin-assumed
greater responsibilities for himself, attacked political allies of the president, and
courted a separate power base of his own. In short, Primakov "turned his
firepower on the Kremlin [the presidency] itself." Phil Reeves, Resign? Over His
DeadBody, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 11, 1999, at 1.
240.
"[Tihe presidency... has been growing weaker, or at least more erratic,
as Mr. Yeltsin's health and morale have failed him." Still Most Awkward Partners,
ECONOMIST, May 9, 1998, at 23. Indeed, "Yeltsin's decline may well make the
main institution of government, the presidency, a force more for instability than
for stability." Id.
241.
See Daniel Williams, Russian ParliamentFinallyApproves Tight Budget,
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1999, at A22. The Duma approved the budget 308 to 58.
Following the vote, Primakov told legislators, "[t]he historic opportunity of
accepting the budget shows not only political support for the government but also
opens up new scope for our activity." Id. The lack of confrontation stood in stark
contrast to the budget battles in previous years. See supra notes 147-49 and
accompanying text.
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either the Duma or Primakov and his ministers. 2 42 In addition,
the Duma would drop its impeachment proceedings against
Yeltsin. 24 3
The President, however, dismissed the proposal,
although he subsequently agreed to a truce with Primakov,
promising not to fire the Prime Minister before the next
That such peace proposals are even
presidential election. 2 4
discussed suggests significant flaws in the Constitution. The
different branches of power, which are popularly elected, should
not have to bargain among themselves in order to remain in
office.
Nevertheless, despite rumors and speculation about an
impending state of emergency declaration or a cabinet shuffle, the
Duma proceeded apace in its quixotic attempt to oust the
President, scheduling debate for mid-May. 245 The Duma charged
Yeltsin with five offenses: (1) waging the disastrous war in
Chechnya in 1994-1996; (2) sending tanks against the rebellious
parliament in October 1993; (3) breaking up the Soviet Union in
1991; (4) committing genocide against the Russian people; and (5)
2
destroying the army. 46
On the eve of the May impeachment debate, however, Yeltsin
surprised the Duma and political observers by sacking
Primakov. 2 4 7 The President's action was yet another in a string of
dramatic hirings and firings of cabinet ministers undertaken
largely to demonstrate his continuing vigor and relevance to the
political process. 24 8 Yeltsin's maneuver highlighted the prospect
of a new constitutional infirmity, not before seen: what happens if
the Duma votes down a nominee for prime minister three timesthus requiring its dissolution-while impeachment is proceeding,
which prohibits dissolution during that time? 24 9 Fortunately, a
crisis was averted, thanks to the Duma's sudden collapse of will.
The Duma, despite its fury over the President's insolence, not

242.
See David McHugh, Proposal Would Only Help Primakov, Moscow
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1999.
243.
See id.
244.
See Boris Yeltsin and Yevgeny Primakov Conclude Non-Aggression Pact,
Russ. PRESS DIG., Feb. 27, 1999.
245.
See Melissa Akin, Parliament Changes Rules To Make Impeaching
Easier,Moscow TIMES, Apr. 22, 1999.
246.
See Melissa Akin, Deputies Postpone Vote To Impeach, Moscow TIMES,
Apr. 13, 1999.
247.
See David Hoffman, Yeltsin Dismisses His Prime Minister, WASH. POST,
May 13, 1999, at Al.
248.
David Hoffman of The Washington Post described Primakov's firing as
"only the latest of many instances in which Yeltsin has seemed to function more
like a monarch keeping members of his court constantly off guard than a modemday, policy-oriented president." Id.
249.
See Catherine Belton, Yeltsin's Move May Test Constitution, Moscow
TIMES, May 13, 1999; see also KONST. RF arts. 109(4), 111(4).
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only voted against impeachment, 25 0 but it also subsequently
approved Yeltsin's nominee for prime minister, Interior Minister
Sergei Stepashin, by a wide margin. 25 ' One Communist deputy
proved remarkably prescient regarding the Stepashin vote, telling
the Moscow Ymes just before the failed impeachment balloting,
"We will probably take about 10 minutes in the coming days and
just pass his candidacy. It is pretty obvious by now that there is
25 2
not much else we can do."
As he had done in previous showdowns with the Duma
(especially in April 1998), the President may have used economic
influence to sway deputies' votes. Many deputies may have
feared retaliation from the Kremlin for their impeachment
attempt, while still others "were offered jobs or other inducements
to support the President."2 53 Communist deputies-the main
proponents of impeachment-may have been cowed by Kremlin
hints that Yeltsin would strike back at them if impeachment
passed. 25 4 At the very least, most lawmakers probably wished to
retain the perks and jobs they already possessed and hesitated to

250.
See Michael Wines, Drive To Impeach Russian President Dies in
Parliament,N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999, at 1. The votes on each of the five charges
were as follows:
Charge
Illegal war against Chechnya
Genocide against Russian people
Destroying the Russian army
Dismantling the Soviet Union
The October 1993 events

For
283
238
240
239
263

Against
43
88
77
78
60

See id. A minimum of 300 votes on a charge was required for passage of that
charge.
251.
The final vote was 301 to 55. See Richard C. Paddock, Duma Bows to
Yeltsin, OKs Choicefor Premier,L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1999, at A8.
252.
Valeria Korchagina, Parliament To Push Ahead with Impeachment,
MOSCOW TIMES, May 13, 1999. Other deputies echoed the same sentiments
following the vote.
For example, Communist deputy Svetlana Y. Savitskaya
explained that "[o]ur vote for Stepashin doesn't at all mean that we support
Stepashin's personality or support Yeltsin's choice. The way we see it, Stepashin
happens to be the most acceptable candidate that Yeltsin could have imposed on
us." Paddock, supra note 251. Stepashin ultimately only lasted until August
1999, when Yeltsin summarily replaced him with ex-KGB colonel Vladimir Putin.
See Daniel Williams, Yeltsin Sacks Another Premier,WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1999, at
Al. Again, despite grumbling by deputies over the change, the Duma approved
Putin in the first vote, albeit by a close margin, 232 to 84, just six votes over the
minimum. See Melissa Akin, PremierPutin Squeaks Past Duma, Moscow TIMES,
Aug. 17, 1999. The deputies' job security in the face of potential dissolution
probably once again was a factor, "It]he vote also showed that the deputies
decided not to provoke a confrontation with Yeltsin and approved his candidate,
rather than run the risk of losing their seats during the election campaign." Id.
253. Wines, supra note 250. See also Lynn Berry & Valeria Korchagina,
Duma Votes 'No' on Impeachment, MOSCOW TIMES, May 18, 1999.
254.
See Berry & Korchagina, supranote 253.
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255
risk them in an impossible bid to remove the President.
Nevertheless, as a spokesman for one Communist deputy
suggested, "This is a big achievement of the Parliament, that2 5it6
can speak out against the Government and its actions."
Indeed, it would be difficult to conceive of another era in Russian
history in which such opposition to the country's leader would
not have resulted in dissolution of the legislature, arrests, or even
executions.

V.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Russia has made great strides in recent years toward a
system based on the rule of law and respecting the separation of
powers within government.2 s 7 Though subject to abuse, the
current Constitution has created a system unseen in Russian
history. In the Duma, Russians have a relatively independent
legislature, albeit one that continues to exist under the thumb of
the executive. As such, it is distinguished from both the Soviet
legislatures subject to the edicts of the Communist Party 2 58 and
2 59
the pre-Revolutionary Duma subject to the whim of the tsar.
Despite the continued outrageousness of many deputies, 2 60 the
Duma since 1996 has shown "growing maturity and realism" in
its actions. 2 6 ' Moreover, as the legislature finds its voice for
legitimate opposition, as Grigory Yavlinsky's Yabloko party has
coherent and
done, "the next Duma may well prove 26more
2
constructive than its predecessor has been."

255.
See David Filipov, Yeltsin Avoids Impeachment,But New Battle Looms in
Duma, BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 1999, at A3.
256.
See Wines, supranote 250 (quoting Aleksandr Volkov).
257.
See supra Parts II.D-E.
See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
258.
See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
259.
For example, radical General Albert Makashov made derogatory anti260.
Semitic remarks on the floor of the Duma, for which he remained unrepentant
and which the legislature refused to condemn. See Duma Refuses To Rebuke
Deputy for Insulting Jews, MOScOW TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998. Nationalist deputies also
sponsored a December 1998 resolution that would call on Monica Lewinsky to
plead with President Clinton to halt the U.S. bombing of Iraq. See Andrei Zolotov,
Jr., LDPR Asks Lewinsky To Rein In Clinton, Moscow TIMES, Dec. 18, 1998. In
1995, during a Duma session, nationalist deputy Nikolai Lysenko "yanked off
[priest and liberal deputy Gleb] Yakunin's metal cross and hit him with it.' David
McHugh, Zhirinovsky's Party Defamed Deputy, Moscow TIMES, Aug. 13, 1998.
Vladimir Zhirinovsky and a female deputy who had come to Yakunin's defense
subsequently scuffled, with Zhirinovsky putting her in a headlock and pulling her
hair. See id. The entire incident was caught on videotape and has been
"broadcast on Russian television ad infinitum over the years." Id.
End ofa Roadfor Russia?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1998, at 46.
261.
262.
Id.
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Yet such progress is neither complete nor secure. The Duma
remains subservient to the president, who continues to wield
Moreover, with different individuals in
substantial authority.
positions of power, the balance of power between the two
branches could shift disastrously in favor of either the legislature
Opposition deputies in the Duma are eager to
or executive.
introduce amendments redistributing some of the president's

However, too much of a
powers to the legislature. 2 6 3
redistribution will merely replace autocratic presidential rule with
chaotic parliamentary rule2 6 4 and could even lead to a power
seizure by Communists or nationalists in the Duma.
That the viability of the Constitution depends so much on
those at the highest levels of authority indicates that its drafting
remains incomplete. Nevertheless, amendments must be made
carefully. To a certain extent, a presidential republic in which
laws can be passed quickly is necessary for Russia to implement
wide-ranging social and economic reforms. 2 65 Moreover, allowing
the parliament to be the driving force behind such reforms
creates two interrelated risks. First, communist-nationalist
deputies would assume greater power to reverse the current
course and potentially to reassert state dominance over the
economy and society. Second, the legislative process may slow
the pace of reform to a crawl, and waste valuable time in
In Russia, where radical change is
rebuilding the country.
essential at this time, a parliamentary system thus could do more
harm than good.

Deputies began formulating draft amendments immediately following
263.
the Duma's confirmation of Primakov in September 1998. See Vandenko, supra
note 235. The first proposals would allow the Duma to vote no-confidence on
individual members of the government, in addition to the government as a whole,
enabling the legislature "to respond to decisions and actions of government
members and to exert influence on the government's policy." Id. The Duma has
supported such amendments for years. See, e.g., Opposition in State Duma Comes
Out To Broaden Its Powers, Russ. PRESS DIG., Dec. 12, 1996 (reporting that
deputies had proposed a series of amendments "aimed at increasing their powers
and diminishing the presidential ones").
264. Viktor Shenis, one of the architects of the Russian Constitution,
cautioned in a 1997 interview that although the parliament has too few powers,
amendments must be implemented carefully "so as not to upset the existing
balance of forces in any way." Larisa Aidinova, President Personally Amended
Constitution, Russ. PRESS DIG., Dec. 11, 1997. Nevertheless, Shenis advocates a
shift in the balance of power between the executive and the legislature: "Putting all
eggs in one basket is not the best policy." Id.
Indeed, in the American experience, a separate, independent executive
265.
was created after the Framers witnessed the inefficiencies of the Continental
Congress, a body that "found itself incapable of discharging its duties and
responsibilities." Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND
THE PRESIDENT 9 (4th ed. 1997).
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A number of amendments nevertheless could and should be
made. The first amendments should remedy those provisions of
the Constitution that have most hindered the growth of a lawbased state. Most prominent are Articles 111 and 117, which
allow the president to dissolve the Duma in
certain
circumstances. 2 6 6 While many observers initially decried this
authority because it would enable the executive to dispense with
its legislative rival and rule by decree in its absence, 2 6 7 in practice
the president need not even dissolve parliament to have his way.
Instead, the president can dictate policies through mere threats of
dissolution. 2 6 8 Although the Duma stood fast against such
threats in the August-September 1998 showdown with the
President and won its choice for Prime Minister, virtually all other
such standoffs before or since have ended in victory for the
executive. 2 69 The Russian people can therefore be forgiven for
believing that its president is an autocrat and its legislators selfinterested cowards. 2 70 To inculcate respect for constitutional
institutions and for the rule of law generally, the Constitution
must be amended to allow the legislature to exist without fear of
2 71
dissolution.
Further amendments should allow the Duma to assume a
greater role in determining the composition of the government,
thus "making the Cabinet ... answerable to the parliament and

266.
See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
267.
See, e.g., Weisman, supranote 2, at 1378 ("Rather than strengthen the
separation of powers, these provisions will stifle honest democratic debate and
lead to presidential domination of the Duma."); Lien, supra note 10, at 110 ("The
principal drawback of the Constitution is its tendency to centralize power in the
executive branch to an extent that will render meaningless any constitutional
limitations in the presence of an executive who chooses to disregard them.").
268.
See supranotes 188-91 and accompanying text.
269.
See Lowe supranote 164; supra Part IV.B.
270. Indeed, the inability of Russia's institutions to govern effectively in the
years following the collapse of the Soviet Union have engendered general apathy
and pessimism for the future. As The Economist described, "[T]he Russian state
consists of a few shallowly rooted institutions-a presidency, a parliament, a
central bank and so on-which have yet to earn public trust, and which are
dwarfed by an impenetrable and antique hinterland of cynicism, incompetence,
racketeering and bureaucratic dead-weight." End of a Road for Russia?, supra
note 261, at 45.
271.
Some observers understandably are concerned with impasses that can
only be broken with dissolution, or at least the threat of it. See Weisman, supra
note 2, at 1395. To that end, alternative solutions include (1) limiting the
maximum number of times the president could submit a prime ministerial
candidate to two, but allowing the president to dissolve the Duma if it rejects a
subsequent candidate, or (2) requiring the Duma and the president to meet
following a second rejected candidate. See id. Certainly, greater dialogue between
the two branches should facilitate legislation. Yet allowing the president the
power to dispense with a disagreeable legislature, however intractable, runs
contrary to principles of separation of powers and implicitly acknowledges that
compromise is both impossible and unnecessary.
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putting a formal end to the strange practice where ministers are
2 72
subordinate not to the prime minister but the president."
Under the 1993 Constitution, while the president must seek the
parliament's approval of prime ministerial appointments, all other
ministers in the government are appointed without legislative
consideration. 2 73 The provision is understandable in light of the
political situation in 1992-1993, to which the current executivelegislative relationship often resembles, and in which an
intransigent legislature dominated by opponents of reform
By unilaterally
confronted Yeltsin's policies at every step.
appointing his own ministers, the president is able to ensure that
his policies are implemented with little obstruction from the
Duma. Although such debate between opposing world views-that is, communist against capitalist-is likely to continue in
Russia for years to come, democratic, law-based governmental
institutions will gain legitimacy only if they are allowed to engage
in that debate. In other words, ironically, Russia will be neither
democratic nor based on law if communist and nationalist
perspectives are eliminated from government by creating, in the
Duma, a weak vehicle for debating reforms and implementing
opposing policies. Moreover, by allowing the president to hire and
fire new governments at his whim, as Yeltsin repeatedly did, the
Constitution sentences Russia to a fate of lurching from one
Little continuity and
governmental crisis to another. 2 74
predictability in policies can result from these maneuverings2 75
such is the recipe for stagnation.
At the very least, the Constitution needs amendment in order
to eliminate serious procedural inconsistencies that so far have
been avoided. In particular, the prohibition on dissolution of the
directly conflicts with the
Duma during impeachment
requirement that the Duma be disbanded if it refuses to approve
the prime minister after three votes. This situation presented
itself with Stepashin's nomination in May 1999 on the eve of the
impeachment debate. 2 76 Fortunately, however, a constitutional
crisis was averted, as the impeachment failed and Stepashin was

272. Boris Kagalitsky, Last Chance for Rewrite, Moscow TIMES, Mar. 12,
1999.
273. See KONsT. RF art. 83(a), (e).
274. See supranote 247 and accompanying text.
275. See Williams, supranote 252, at Al ("By appointing and dismissing a
succession of prime ministers, Yeltsin has brought a halt to economic and political
reform and deprived Russia of a steady administrative hand at a time when it
desperately needs one").
276. See Catherine Belton, Yeltsin's Move May Test Constitution, Moscow
TIMES, May 13, 1999.
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Nevertheless, the conflict remains in the
approved. 27 7
Constitution.
For the foreseeable future, Russia likely will be hampered by
economic crisis, thus requiring concerted reforms to stabilize the
country. While the ability for decisive action by a single branch
should be protected, such power is accompanied by the
significant risk of overreaching by the empowered branch. If the
past is any guide, one can expect future Russian executives to
seize on domestic crises to consolidate power in their own hands,
for example, as Gorbachev attempted to do in 1990-91278 and as
Yeltsin did in 1993.279 Although the composition of the Duma
has been generally hostile to democratic reforms, Russia's path
toward democracy and the rule of law will be better protected by a
stronger legislature as opposed to an autocratic executive.

VI. CONCLUSION

Without doubt, the Russian Constitution is a flawed
document, requiring amendment if the country is committed to
becoming a democracy. 2 80 For the time being, the Constitution
may suit Russia's needs; the country, with its roots in centralized
government, may be currently incapable of anything more
advanced than its current political system.2 8 1 Perhaps what is
needed is a training period in which Russians, both citizens and
officials, can come to terms with the idea of an independent
legislature before granting that body true autonomy. The last six
years have shown that separated centers of power can coexist and
Stability, however, will have
even cooperate in Russia. 28 2
If
consequences both within and outside Russia's borders.
Russians can embrace key concepts and norms of Western law
and tradition, such as separation of powers, Western businesses
and international financial institutions will be more confident
about investing in Russia, thus stimulating the country's

277.

See supranotes 250-51 and accompanying text.

See SHARLET, supra note 53, at 95 (describing Gorbachev's acquisition
278.
of special emergency and permanent presidential powers to confront growing
internal crises).
279.
See supranotes 84-93 and accompanying text.

280. See McClure, supra note 2 (describing the imbalance of power among
the branches of government; Weisman, supra note 2 (outlining the constitutional
powers granted to the three branches of government and recommending
amendments to the Russian Constitution).
281. Indeed, one Yeltsin adviser has argued that the American separation of
powers system is too sophisticated for Russia. See AHDIEH, supranote 14, at 16667.
282. The modem Duma certainly has met with greater success than did its
pre-Revolutionary ancestor. See supranotes 34-42 and accompanying text.
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economic recovery, and, in turn, its progress toward a more
283
democratic society.
Unfortunately, time may be running out.28 4 With the election
of Vladimir Putin to the presidency, the Russian Constitution
enters a period of greater uncertainty. Should Putin prove to be
even more authoritarian, less conciliatory, and less concerned
with international approval than Yeltsin, the Constitution would
enable significant abuses of power and perhaps ultimately, the
end of Russia's current experiment in democracy and the rule of
Putin's experience as a KGB colonel raises questions
law.2 85
about his commitment to liberal ideas; many view his accession
to the presidency as a symbol of the resurgence of the secret
police agency. 28 6 Nevertheless, while imbuing the executive with
broad authority creates significant risks, the potential danger of
ceding too much power to the Federal Assembly is clear-a halt, if
not a reversal, of democratic, economic, and legal reforms.
Amendments, therefore, must balance carefully among the
aspirations for effective reform, a more restrained executive, and
a more independent legislature.
In terms of its broad authority, the executive in the current
Russian Constitution is a direct descendant of the tsars and
Soviet premiers. 2 8 7 Such centuries-old experience likely means

283. See Donald D. Barry, Introduction to TOWARD THE "RULE OF LAW" IN
RussIA?, supra note 19, at xiii-xiv. Indeed, following the economic and political
turmoil of 1998, international financial institutions agreed that "without deep
changes in the way Russia is governed, lending the country any more money is
useless, or even harmful." Money Can't Buy Me Love, EcONOMIsT, Feb. 6, 1999, at
23.
284. According to one Russian political scientist, time may already have run
this unique
out, particularly with regard to amending the Constitution. "[I1f
window of opportunity [to amend the Constitution] is missed in 1999 then in 2000
we will face a younger and more aggressive autocrat. The consequences are not
hard to predict." Kagalitsky, supra note 272.
285. Yeltsin may have shown respect for constitutional procedures and
norms in part because the Russian Constitution is his document. See AHDIEH,
supra note 14, at 56-62 (describing the Constitutional Conference of 1993, whose
attendees were invited to discuss Yeltsin's proposed constitution), 72-73
(explaining additional presidential powers added to the Constitution at Yeltsin's
behest following the events of October 1993). In contrast, Tsar Nicholas II, who
felt that the Fundamental Laws were largely forced upon him, dissolved the preRevolutionary Duma twice. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
Future presidents thus might not necessarily share Yeltsin's desire to preserve the
order created by the 1993 Constitution.
286. See Richard Paddock, The KGB Rises Again in Russia, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
12, 2000, at Al. In the days after becoming acting president, Putin quickly
appointed many former KGB colleagues to top posts in his administration. See id.
287. Beyond the president's wide-ranging powers, an example of the legacy
of such authoritarian rule in Russia was seen in Yeltsin's continuous need to label
prime ministerial appointments and other high-ranking officials as his chosen
"successors." See Brian Whitmore, The Men Ww Would Be King-Won't, Moscow
According to one political analyst, "Russia isn't a
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1999.
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that a significant weakening of presidential authority is unlikely
in the near future-even less so now given economic weakness
and conflict in Chechnya.
Russia's future stability, however,
requires a more balanced governmental system in which
cooperation, not apocalyptic confrontation, is the norm for
relations among the governmental powers. Nevertheless, despite
examples of presidential excess and legislative cravenness, the
divided power between executive and legislature during the initial
six years of the Russian Constitution represents a major step
forward in light of Russia's history of authoritarian rule and
disregard for the rule of law.
Ian RichardBrown*

monarchy, but the mechanism of transferring power resembles a monarchy." Id.
(quoting Andrei Ryabov).
* J.D. Candidate, 2000, Vanderbilt University; B.A. Cornell University.

